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Mediation by Judges:
A New Phenomenon in the
Transformation of Justice
Louise Otis*
Eric H. Reiter**
INTRODUCTION'
For decades different forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
have been proposed, developed, critiqued, modified, renamed, redefined,
and slowly brought within the usually suspicious, and sometimes hostile,
edifice of state-based normative ordering. Some see this as the vindication
of the "multi-doored courthouse,"' a democratic storming of the Kafkaesque
citadel of the law, which gives a more human face to the law and its
institutions. Others see it as a dangerous dilution or even undermining of
justice, a faddish striving for speed, flexibility, and efficiency at the expense
of principle and accountability What is clear is that the institutionalization
* Justice of the Quebec Court of Appeal. Justice Otis designed the first system of judicial
mediation in appeal and has presided over more than three hundred appellate judicial mediation
sessions in civil, family, commercial, and administrative matters.
** LL.B., B.C.L., LL.M. (McGill University), B.A. (Cornell University), M.A., Ph.D.
(University of Toronto).
+ The authors would like to acknowledge with thanks Pierre A. Michaud, former Chief Justice
of Quebec, under whose auspices and encouragement the Quebec judicial mediation program was
established, and J.J. Michel Robert, current Chief Justice of Quebec, who supported the extension of
the program to criminal matters.
1. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 216-18 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Many
Doors?]. The image of the "multi-doored courthouse" comes from Frank Sandar's work in the
1970s. See id. at 216 n.19. Resnik argues, however, that the dream of access is increasingly giving
way to formalism and rigidity. See id.
2. The literature on ADR is vast. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J.
2663 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute]; Jean R. Stemlight, ADR Is Here:
Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2003) [hereinafter
Stemlight, ADR Is Here] (providing particularly useful overviews with bibliographical orientation).
3. Authors from a variety of perspectives have voiced reservations and criticisms of ADR
with differing degrees of concern regarding its challenges to classical adjudication. See generally
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of ADR is an indication of fundamental changes at work in our legal system
and in our concepts of justice and law.
In this article, we discuss one such form of institutionalized ADR-
judicial mediation, where sitting judges themselves act as mediators in
programs closely integrated with the traditional adjudicative system.4 We
draw on the experience of Quebec's voluntary judicial mediation program,
which the court of appeal first instituted in 1997 and which has since
expanded to include almost all courts and administrative tribunals, to assess
some of the ways in which judicial mediation challenges and complements
traditional notions of adjudicative justice.5
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial
Judges]; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against
Settlement]; Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss, Out of Eden];
Yves-Marie Morissette, (Do)judiciarisation, (d)juridicisation et accs h Ia justice, 51 R. Du B. 585
(1991); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:
Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 1OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL. 297
(1996). See also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619
(1995) (responding to some of these arguments).
4. Not surprisingly, given its novelty, there has been little discussion of judicial mediation as
a totally integrated part of a hybrid system of justice (including all courts and tribunals), as opposed
to mediation that court-based but non-judicial mediators perform, on the one hand, or to judicial
settlement conferences on the other. See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator
in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1985-1986); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Hugh F.
Landerkin & Andrew J. Pirie, Judges as Mediators: What's the Problem with Judicial Dispute
Resolution in Canada?, 82 CAN. BAR REV. 249 (2003); Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and
Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232 (2003); Laurence Boulle, Judicial Policies on Mediation and ADR:
Australian Trends, 15 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 194 (2004).
5. The system at the Quebec Court of Appeal works on the basis of a Joint Request for
Mediation that the parties present to the court by which they agree to mediate their dispute before a
judge and to keep the proceedings confidential. The initiative can come from the parties themselves
(or their lawyers) or from a suggestion by a judge that the case is amenable to mediation, but at all
times the process is voluntary. In addition, either party can abandon mediation at any time and
return to the adjudicative stream. See QUE. CODE CIv. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 508.1 for a basic
overview of the program:
A judge may at any time preside a settlement conference to assist the parties in resolving
their dispute. The judge enjoys judicial immunity while presiding such a conference. The
conference is held in private, at no cost to the parties and without formality.
A settlement conference may only be held at the written joint request of the parties. The
filing of such a request suspends the running of the time limits prescribed by this Title.
A settlement conference is confidential and is governed by the rules defined by the judge
and the parties. The judge who presides at the conference cannot take part in any hearing
relating to the matter.
Any transaction resolving the matter is sent by the clerk to a panel of the court so that it
may be homologated and rendered enforceable.
See also Suzanne Courteau, La conciliation judiciaire t la Cour supdrieure, 3 REVUE DE
PREVENTION ET REGLEMENT DES DIFFtRENDS 51 (2005); Louise Otis, The Conciliation Service
Program of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, 11 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 80 (2000)
[hereinafter Otis, Conciliation Service Program]; Louise Otis, La justice conciliationnelle: l'envers
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The Quebec model is particularly important, because unlike the various
experiments with pilot projects or limited initiatives in mediation that other
jurisdictions have tried, the Quebec justice system now integrates
adjudicative and mediational justice at every level and in virtually every area
of law, including family matters, civil and commercial law, administrative
matters, and, recently, criminal law.6 It is a unified and integrated hybrid
system of justice, unique in the world in its longevity and its
comprehensiveness.7  As a result, it provides a vivid illustration of the
fundamental changes that can result from a radical reorientation of how
justice is rendered.8 We argue that judicial mediation heralds a new,
participant-centered normative order, one that conceptualizes litigation more
du lent droit, 3 ETHIQUE PUBLIQUE: REVUE INTERNATIONALE D'tTHIQUE SOCItTALE ET
GOUVERNEMENTALE 63 (2001) [hereinafter Otis, L 'envers du lent droit] (introducing the systems,
goals, and safeguards of judicial mediation in Quebec); Louise Otis, La conciliation judiciaire 6 la
Cour d'appel du Qudbec, 1 REVUE DE PRtVENTION ET RtGLEMENT DES DIFFtRENDS 1 (2003)
[hereinafter Otis, La conciliation judiciaire]; Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Judicial Mediation in
Quebec, in GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION (Nadja Alexander ed., 2d ed. forthcoming).
6. Otis, Conciliation Service Program, supra note 5, at 81. In 2004, the Quebec justice
system made available a pilot project in "facilitation" in criminal matters, both at first instance and
on appeal. The program allows judges and lawyers to meet to seek agreement on any issue relating
to the case, including sentencing. Like civil mediation, the process remains confidential; but unlike
civil mediation the parties (the victim and the accused) are not present, and the judge must provide
reasons for accepting, rejecting, or modifying the joint proposal reached during negotiations. See
Lefebvre v. R., 2005 QCCA 56, J.E. 2005-487 (Que.) (providing an example of the results of the
system in practice), http://www.jugements.qc.ca/php/decision.php?liste=15269528&doc=4100555
5005D 1900 (with a link to an unofficial English translation).
7. Systems presenting analogies to the Quebec model have been in place for some time in
Norway and Denmark and were introduced in Finland as of January 1, 2006. Email from Judge
Kristen Kjelland-Mordre, Oslo District Court, Norway (Nov. 25, 2005) (providing information on
these developments). See Bdatrice Blohom-Brenneur, Visage de la mdiationjudiciaire en France,
3 REVUE DE PRtVENTION ET REGLEMENT DES DIFFIRENDS 65 (2005) (providing a survey ofjudicial
mediation in France).
8. The judicial mediation program at the Quebec Court of Appeal, which will serve as a
recurring example in this article, has, since its inauguration in 1998, conducted around five hundred
mediations in family, civil, commercial, and administrative matters. See Otis, Conciliation Service
Program, supra note 5. Similar programs-adapted to the needs of first-instance tribunals-are in
place at the Quebec Superior Court, the Court of Quebec, and the Tribunal Administratif du Quebec.
See, e.g., Une Alternative: La Conciliation, Tribunal Administratif du Quebec, at
http://www.taq.gouv.qc.ca/recours-taq/altemative.jsp (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) (describing the
court's conciliation program). Among other Canadian appellate courts, judicial mediation programs
of varying scope are now in place in Ontario, British Columbia and the Yukon (pilot projects), and
the Federal Court of Appeal. See JULIA MACFARLANE, LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA,
TRANSFORMING RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH PARTICIPATORY JUSTICE 4-5 (2003); see also Joan I.
McEwen, JDR: Judicial Dispute Resolution, 8 NAT'L 36 (1999) (The survey is now somewhat
dated.).
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broadly and holistically and, thus, offers justice that is fuller and better
adapted to the needs of parties with a variety of conflicts.
It is increasingly apparent that "alternative" dispute resolution is
becoming part of the mainstream, a part of the legal landscape accepted-
sometimes grudpingly, sometimes enthusiastically-by litigants, lawyers,
and courts alike. In Canada, for example, at least eight of the provinces, all
three territories, and the Federal Court have some form of ADR attached to
the court system.10 This is an ongoing project, but in our opinion, the
operative question is now no longer whether ADR has a place in the justice
system, but rather how, where, and who should do it. It is now time to begin
assessing the integration of ADR in our legal system, not so much its
9. See Stemlight, ADR Is Here, supra note 2 (surveying reception in the United States).
10. The various approaches include mediation conducted by judges (Quebec and Ontario at the
appellate level and the Federal Court), judicial settlement conferences (British Columbia, Yukon,
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut), and court-ordered or court-sanctioned mediation by
professional mediators (Newfoundland and Labrador; Nova Scotia in family matters; New
Brunswick in family matters; Ontario at first instance; Manitoba in family matters; and Alberta). For
examples of judicial mediation, see The Conciliation Service Program of the Court of Appeal of
Quebec, http://www.tribunaux.qc.ca/mjq_en/c-appe/about/fscreation.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2006); Andrew C. Dekany, Focus on Alternative Dispute Resolution: Judges Increasingly Mediating
in Ontario and Quebec, LAW. WKLY., Jan. 21, 2005 (describing judicial mediation at the Ontario
Court of Appeal); and Federal Court Rules, 1998, C.R.C., SOR/98-106, s. 387 (providing for dispute
resolution conferences with a case management judge or prothonotary in Canada's Federal Court),
http://www.canlii.org/ca/regu/sor98-106/whole.html. For examples of judicial settlement
conferences, see British Columbia Court of Appeal Practice Directive: Judicial Settlement
Conferences (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/ca/whats%20new/SETTLEMENT%2OFi
nal%20PD.htm; Government of Yukon Department of Justice: Supreme Court ("The [Yukon]
Supreme Court follows the Rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia[,]" including its rules
for judicial settlement conferences.), http://www.justice.gov.yk.ca/prog/cs/supr/supremecrt.html
(2001); Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, N.W.T. Reg. 010-96, s.283 (2005)
(providing the rules for judicial settlement conferences for the Northwest Territories and Nunavut),
http://www.canlii.or g/nt/laws/regu/1 996r.010/20050211/partl .html. For examples of court-ordered
or court-sanctioned mediation by professional mediators, see Rules of the Supreme Court, S.N.L.
1986, c. 42, Sch. D, r. 37A (providing for Newfoundland and Labrador's court-ordered mediation
program), http://www. canlii.org/nl/laws/regu/1942c.42sch.d/20051121/part45.html (Nov. 18, 2005);
Services: Mediation, The Courts of Nova Scotia (describing the Supreme Court's Family Division
conciliation and mediation programs), http://www.courts.ns.ca/supreme/scfamily6.htm (2006);
Mediation Services, Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick (providing for mediation in matters
before the Family Division of New Brunswick's Court of Queen's Bench), http:// www.gnb.ca/cou
r/04CQB/M ediation-e.asp (2004); Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.1
(establishing a pilot project in mandatory mediation for case-managed actions in Ontario's Superior
Court of Justice), http://www.canlii.org/on/laws/regu/1990r.194/20050211/partl html; Court of
Queen's Bench Rules, C.C.S.M. c. C280, Manitoba Reg. 553/88, r. 70.16 (Oct. 31, 2005) (providing
for mediation in family matters before Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench), http://web2.gov.mb.ca/
laws/rules/qbr2e.php#70.16; and Civil Mediation Program, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta
(describing a two-year pilot project in civil mediation at Alberta's Court of Queen's Bench),
http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/go/CourtofQueensBench/CiviMediationProgram/tabid/74/Default.as
px (Apr. 1, 2006).
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practical impact (which has been the object of research already)" but its
normative impact (which remains largely still to be examined).12
Towards this end, we discuss in this article how judicial mediation in
particular, which brings ADR into the very heart of state-run legal
institutions, affects both classical adjudication and also mediation itself. At
the same time, we address what we perceive to be the key advantages of
mediation by judges, as well as some of the potential concerns about it.
Judicial mediation brings into sharp relief the issue of the relationship
between state-sanctioned and private forms of normative ordering. It raises
a host of interesting questions that we will address in what follows,
including: What are the implications of this trend for a legal system still
primarily based on the paradigm of adjudication of adversarial disputes?
What limits (practical, normative, or ethical) does the dominant model place
on judicial mediation? What challenges does judicial mediation present for
the dominant model? How can the sometimes conflicting needs of disputing
parties and justice best be reconciled? And, how can the judge-mediator
best manage the sometimes conflicting ethical obligations of the
participants?
This article has three principal parts. In the first, we present an
overview of judicial mediation and how it responds to some of the perceived
problems with the classical model of adjudication.1 3  In this analysis, we
II. See Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994); Michaela Keet & Teresa B.
Salamone, From Litigation to Mediation: Using Advocacy Skills for Success in Mandatory or Court-
Connected Mediation, 64 SASK. L. REV. 57 (2001); Julie Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46
MCGILL L.J. 663 (2001) [hereinafter Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?]; GEORGE W. ADAMS,
MEDIATING JUSTICE: LEGAL DISPUTE NEGOTIATIONS (2003); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness
of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55 (2004); and
Timothy K. Kuhner, Court-Connected Mediation Compared: The Cases ofArgentina and the United
States, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519 (2005) for some examples among many.
12. Some interesting work has been done on this issue. See, e.g., Sternlight, ADR Is Here,
supra note 2; Louise Lalonde, La midiation, une approche 'internormative' des diffirends? Analyse
comparative des approches de G.A. Legault et de R.A. Macdonald, 33 R.D.U.S. 97 (2002-2003);
Louise Lalonde, Les modes de PRD: vers une nouvelle conception de la justice?, I REVUE DE
PREVENTION ET DE RtGLEMENT DES DIFFtRENDS 17 (2003); Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-
Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117 (2004).
See also LOUISE OTIS, LA TRANSFORMATION DE NOTRE RAPPORT AU DROIT PAR LA MDIATION
JUDICIAIRE (2005) [hereinafter OTIS, LA TRANSFORMATION] (discussing judicial mediation as an
answer to conflict and problems within the traditional justice system); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1 (2000) (presenting the intellectual genealogy of ADR).
13. See infra Part A.
355
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draw especially on the experience with judicial mediation at the appellate
level at the Quebec Court of Appeal. In the second part, we examine the
unfolding of the mediation process itself, using an annotated guide to
judicial mediation to address broader issues of both practical and theoretical
concern. 14 In the third part, we consider the crucial question of ethics in
mediation, signaling some of the problems in applying ethical models
developed in the context of classical adversarial litigation and advocacy to
mediation.15  Finally, we conclude by suggesting some continuing
challenges and subjects for further study. 16
A. From Classical Adjudication to Judicial Mediation
"Alternative" dispute resolution suggests the existence of a dispute-
resolution norm-perhaps even a default choice-in comparison to which
other forms like mediation, conciliation, settlement conferences, sentencing
circles, med-arb, and the rest are imperfect reflections, even second-best
choices. In modem western society that norm remains adjudication or court-
based resolution of adversarial disputes between parties who bring a
specifically-focused and legally-defined problem before a judge. But was
adjudication ever really the norm? Though the image of a state monopoly
on dispute resolution is strongly fixed in the popular imagination, reinforced
by movies and television, other forms of extrajudicial dispute resolution
have a long history alongside adjudication.1 7  More importantly for our
purposes, the state-monopoly view rests on an overly narrow
conceptualization of both disputes and their resolution.18
If we look at all kinds of disputes, we realize that the vast majority of
conflicts arise and are resolved far from state institutions. Without recourse
to courts, mediators, arbitrators, or other formal mechanisms, individuals
14. See infra Part B.
15. See infra Part C.
16. See infra Part D.
17. Disputing parties in medieval England, for example, regularly resorted to a variety of non-
litigious dispute-resolution techniques, such as direct negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. See
Edward Powell, Arbitration and the Law in England in the Late Middle Ages, 33 TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL HIST. Soc'y 49 (5th ser. 1983). More recently, Quebec toyed with a formal mediation
program from 1899-1920 for "matters purely personal affecting moveables and when the amount
claimed does not exceed twenty-five dollars." An Act respecting conciliation, S.Q. 1899, c. 54
(Que.) (quotation at s. 1). The parties were obliged to submit to "conciliation" before inscribing
their case for adjudication. The program was abolished in 1920 by An Act to amend the Revised
Statutes, 1909, respecting conciliation, S.Q. 1920, c. 76 (Que.).
18. Cf Galanter & Cahill, supra note 4, at 1390 (arguing that settlement has always been part
of even classical adjudication). "Once we see settlements not as a stray byproduct of the judicial
process, but as part of the essential core, the responsibilities of courts can no longer be defined as
coextensive with adjudication." Id
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effectively and usually painlessly resolve thousands of minor-sometimes
even major-daily problems, such as arguments among family or friends,
disagreements between neighbors about snow removal or barking dogs, and
conflicts between parents and teachers over teaching methods. Life in
society would be impossible if it were otherwise.
The work of both Stewart Macaulay on informal dispute resolution
techniques among American businesspeople in the 1950s1 9 and of Robert
Ellickson on private normative ordering among California ranchers in the
1980s 20 shows that state institutions for resolving disputes are merely the
most recognizable or visible of dispute resolution mechanisms and that we
should see a dispute-resolution continuum rather than a stark division
between state institutions on the one hand and "informal" methods on the
other. If we stop viewing state-based law and its institutions as effectively
having a monopoly on dispute resolution, from which any "alternative"
forms need to be chipped away and justified, we make room for other forms
of normative ordering on an equal footing with traditional adjudication.2 1
Put another way, the issue becomes whether we wish to view the law as a
monolithic edifice or as something more open and flexible, which a society
in constant movement continually reshapes and reinvents.
What ADR, in general, and judicial mediation, in particular, represent
are the institutionalization of some of these informal ways of normative
ordering, bringing the power of informal justice within the purview of state2
legal systems. In what follows, we do not argue for replacing traditional
adjudication, nor for juridicizing the vast numbers of everyday conflicts that
are already satisfactorily dealt with outside the courts, whether by the parties
themselves or by professional mediators. Rather, we argue that
complementing traditional adjudication with judicial mediation allows state
dispute-resolution institutions to reflect new exigencies better, which helps
them provide better justice for those who bring their disputes to the justice
system for resolution. Before we begin examining this process and its
19. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
20. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
21. This idea is explored in RODERICK A. MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW 38-42
(2002).
22. See Jean-Pierre Bonaf6-Schmitt, La mdiation: une alternative 6 la justice?, in SOURCES
ET INSTRUMENTS DE JUSTICE EN DROIT PRIVE 141 (Nicholas Kasirer & Pierre Noreau eds., 2002)
(suggesting that the development of mediation is evidence of increasing decentralization and
pluralism injustice systems).
357
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effects, a brief overview of both classical adjudication and judicial mediation
is in order.
1. The Classical System
As western societies have evolved, their state justice institutions have
increasingly become the principal locus for the formal expression and
resolution of conflicts. This is partly due to the imperialism implicit in the
law, which colonizes ever more areas of human activity to bring them within
its discourse, and partly due to the decline of parallel normative orders,
notably religion.23 Though the hegemony of law is far from complete-
science, for example, provides a powerful foil to law's ambitions-western
society in the early twenty-first century is highly legalized.
More specifically, however, these formal state justice institutions
embody law of a particular kind, with characteristic dispute-resolution
mechanisms that reflect the law they apply. The principal formal
mechanism for resolving legal disputes remains the trial, which employs an
adversarial and contradictory procedure that has the effect of juridicizing the
conflict. The power of the adjudicative paradigm is such that even other
"alternative" modes of dispute resolution draw strength from their position
in "the shadow of the law,, 24 and the adjudicative norm still colors their
disputes, gives urgency to their resolution, and provides at least an implicit
threat to keep them on track. The norm, in short, is a state-controlled justice
system whose essential purpose is to balance the parties' opposing interests
251
or subjective rights by means of a judicial decision.
The classical adversarial system has several principal characteristics that
work towards shaping the dispute and determining how it is to be resolved.26
The trial (or the appellate hearing) works by the polarization of the parties'
roles (plaintiff-defendant, appellant-respondent), by the opposition of legal
representatives for each side, and by the exacerbation of the antagonism at
the source of the conflict.27 In short, the adversarial system takes a conflict
and makes it into a dispute-a narrowly-focused, legally-defined event with
which the court can deal.28
These characteristics of the adversarial system also combine to make
contradictory debate procedurally intensive and, many would say, unwieldy,
23. Morissette, supra note 3, at 596-97.
24. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
25. See generally GERALD L. GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 333-34 (5th ed. 2004).
26. OTIS, LA TRANSFORMATION, supra note 12, at 12.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 12-13.
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since discovery, preliminary exceptions, incidental proceedings, expert
reports, and other procedural steps weigh it down.29 On a substantive level,
the cornerstone of contradictory justice is the judicial determination of those
respective rights and obligations of the parties that are engaged by the
complaint giving rise to the action.3 ° The cause and the resolution of the
broader conflict behind the legal dispute are, at best, only incidentally the
object of the judicial contract; the judge can safely ignore this wider conflict
as long as he or she handles the dispute, as defined by the parties.3'
Many factors have contributed to ensuring the longevity of the
contradictory justice system, which today remains the via regia of legal
conflict resolution. These include the independence and impartiality of the
decision-maker; the application of a uniform and neutral procedural code;
the assurance of a judicial decision based in its essentials on the evidence
produced by the parties; and the resolution of disputes with regard for the
rule of law and for juridical stability, as assured by judicial precedents.32
On a deeper level, however, the judiciary's role in social regulation
itself works to bolster the classical system. As judges are increasingly asked
to pronounce on ever more highly-charged social questions, 33 they are
implicitly asked to define the terms of the evolution of the relationship
between the individual and society. The classical adjudicative system,
therefore, with its procedural guarantees of fundamental justice and fairness,
becomes a crucial arbiter of change.34 By virtue of its role in translating the
relativity and specificity of the juridical norm into general principles for
social ordering, the judiciary bears witness to the degree of risk that a
29. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 29, 34 (1982).
30. See generally Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. BAR REV.
406, 408-37 (1968) (describing the adjudicatory model of judicial decision-making).
31. See id.; Alexander J. Black, Separated by a Common Law: American and Scottish Legal
Education, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 15, 31 (1993); Kenneth J. Rigby, Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 44 LA. L. REV. 1725, 1727 (1984).
32. See GALL, supra note 25, at 209-10. Many other factors play a role, of course. In
particular we might mention the inertia of the professional practice of lawyers, whose training and
institutional culture have long privileged the adversarial system, and the preferences of parties to
litigation, many of whom desire for various reasons to have their day in court.
33. One thinks, for example, of abortion, assisted suicide, or the definition of marriage.
34. See, e.g., Beverley McLachlin, The Supreme Court and the Public Interest, 64 SASK. L.
REV. 309, 311 (2001) ("So the primary task-indeed the only task-of judges is to resolve disputes
between members of society or between members of society and the state. Yet in performing this
function, judges inevitably are expected to perform a second function, namely, to ensure that the law
develops in a way that is good for society and the men, women and children who are its members.").
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pluralistic western society is willing to take regarding the common values
that mold it.
These characteristics make the classical system highly suited to certain
tasks, but, for others, it has serious shortcomings.35 Scholars have discussed
the limitations of the classical system time and again.36  Of particular
importance for a discussion of judicial mediation, we might mention long
delays (administrative and procedural); 37 judicial and extrajudicial costs
related to adversarial debate;38 agency costs resulting, at times, from
overlapping interests; 39 the physical and psychological trauma associated
with long judicial conflicts;40 and the inherent limits of contradictory debate
for finding the best solution that would, in real terms, put an end to the
dispute.
35. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 370-71,
397-99 (1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication] (noting in particular that adjudication is ill-suited to
dealing effectively with "polycentric" problems); see also Otis, L "envers du lent droit, supra note 5,
at 64.
36. Good recent general overviews (from different sides of the debate, to be sure) are Judith
Resnik, For Owen M Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death ofAdjudication, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 173 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, For Owen M Fiss] and Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution
in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7 (2004) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, From
Legal Disputes].
37. At the appellate level in Quebec, the procedural time limits (inscription in appeal,
appearance, factum preparation, incidental proceedings, etc.) inherent in any ordinary civil case vary
between eight and ten months. It is only once these time limits have expired that the appeal is
deemed ready and can be put on the roll for hearing. It then takes on average another eighteen
months for the appeal to be heard.
38. A 1996 study, led by the Ontario Commission of Revision of Civil Justice, established the
fees related to a typical civil case at over $38,000 CDN, with parties applying seventy-five percent of
the amount awarded towards fees and legal costs. See CAN. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE CAN. BAR
ASS'N TASK FORCE ON SYS. OF CIVIL JUSTICE 15-16 (1996) (Chair: Eleanor Cronk).
39. The term "agency costs" refers to situations in which a party having authority to make
decisions for another has incentives to favor his or her own interest over that of the other. The term
is most often used in economic analyses of corporate law, but agency costs can arise in litigation as
well. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
40. During the course of appellate judicial mediation sessions, parties consistently and
spontaneously mention the physical and psychological effects of enduring disputes. See Otis,
Conciliation Service Program, supra note 5, at 81. Parties and their attorneys both frequently report
episodes of situational depression as well as pathologies related to the stress of judicial litigation.
See id.
41. For example, in matters related to property law (boundary marking, servitudes or
easements, common property, co-ownership, etc.), the adjudicative function, limited as it is to the
judicial contract of the parties and the rigid application of the resulting norm, has a hard time
achieving complete resolution. Thus, the conflicts related to such matters often flare up again.
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None of these problems are new, of course, and the topos of the delays
and costs of justice has a long history.42 We believe that the convergence of
these problems, however, indicates the existence of a real crisis in the
authoritative judicial order, as the classical system is proving to be less than
ideal for or even ill-suited to a growing percentage of disputes brought
before it. A fundamental incompatibility exists between the judicial function
as it has come to be constructed and many of the disputes it is called upon to
adjudicate.
The act of judging proceeds from reflexive analysis and a maturation of
juridical thought; this process, which necessarily takes a great deal of time,
both runs on and generates positive law, debate, and argument. Of course,
for practical reasons, it is essential that the course of a judicial dispute,
which will end in final judgment, be subject to procedural and, by necessary
implication, temporal constraints. But while these efficiency measures may
indeed restrict frivolous or dilatory actions, they can never be allowed to
constrain the act of judging, which is introspective and cautious by nature.
In short, the very qualities of discernment, reason, and wisdom that give
traditional adjudication its authority also prevent it from changing so as to
meet the demands of an increasing volume of litigation.
This is as it should be; what we see happening is not-cannot be-a
dilution or dumbing down of the adjudicative function to meet efficiency
targets but rather the development of another form of justice, complementary
to the classical system and based on an entirely different model of rendering
justice. For, if the mission of adjudication, or the act of judging, remains
steadfast, we must nevertheless recognize that, in most civil disputes,
complex and procedurally-oriented contradictory debate is ill-suited both to
the efficient resolution of these disputes in modem juridical reality and to
the interests of litigants.
2. Judicial Mediation
ADR has developed in response to these perceived weaknesses of the
classical model in the face of society's changing needs and expectations
regarding a justice system. Flexible, party-centered modes of dispute
resolution address many of the shortcomings of the adversarial system.
Different conflicts respond to different solutions, however, so a diversity of
42. See Sylvio Normand, De la difficultg de rendre une justice rapide et peu coateuse: une
perspective historique (1840-1965), 40 C. DE D. 13 (1999) (discussing the history of more than a
century of such complaints in Quebec).
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techniques is called for.43 In our view, for disputes that are already within
the adjudicative system or that have proved resistant to extrajudicial
resolution, judicial mediation presents a powerful alternative to the often
blunt instrument of an adversarial trial. It offers a via media, combining
some of the legal and moral gravitas of adjudication with the flexibility and
adaptability of ADR. It thus represents not just an efficiency reform but also
a reconceptualization of the role of the courts and judges in dispensing
4justice.
Judicial mediation obviously presents numerous advantages over the
traditional adversarial system from the point of view of efficiency. By
eliminating the need for the preparation of appellate facta or briefs and court
transcriptions, the parties benefit from significant savings of time and cost.
45
Additionally, turn-around time is vastly improved: in Quebec, mediation
sessions are normally scheduled within thirty days following the receipt of
the written request, so the issue of backlog largely disappears. This brings
corresponding improvements to the traditional system of justice itself,
because cases slated for mediation leave the adjudicative pipeline-
permanently in the majority of cases-thereby removing much of the clutter
from court dockets.
The cost reductions achieved in the mediation process also reduce the
incentives a better-positioned party has to use the system to its advantage, a
situation that could have the effect of straining the resources of the other
party and effectively forcing the latter to settle regardless of the strength of
its position at law.46 In such circumstances, it is unlikely that the result
achieved would represent a fair bargain between the parties. Accordingly,
by reducing the costs of achieving post-trial resolution, judicial mediation
should enable the participation of a greater number of parties and so should
reduce the incidence of outright economic coercion.
Moreover, efficiency gains can result even from a mediation process
that does not end in settlement. By the time the parties resign themselves to
abandoning mediation and returning to the adversarial system, they will have
gained valuable insight into the issues and pertinent facts underpinning their
43. See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 11.
44. It is worth recalling at this point that we refer here to mediation that a judge conducts
within a courthouse setting as neutral third party and not to the various forms of evaluative or
binding judicial intervention, such as settlement conferences or mini-trials.
45. See generally David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv.
72 (1983) (analyzing the results of the Civil Litigation Research Project on litigation costs in the
United States).
46. Cf Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 3, at 1076-77 ("[T]he distribution of financial
resources, or the ability of one party to pass along its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining
process, and the settlement will be at odds with a conception of justice that seeks to make the wealth
of the parties irrelevant.").
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dispute. They will likely have come to a realization of which issues remain
intractable and which do not, and can thus agree either to a partial settlement
or at least to focus litigation on the principal outstanding issues between
them. Ultimately, this can only make preparation for the eventual hearing-
if not the hearing itself-a less resource-intensive and more efficient
exercise.
Beyond efficiency, however, judicial mediation also satisfies other,
more intangible needs.47 First, mediation allows the parties to shift the
emphasis of dispute resolution towards agreement and away from the
familiar win-lose equation. This decreases the tension on the parties to the
dispute and, importantly, serves to reduce mental pressure. To this end, the
judge can help the parties escape the narrow confines of the specific legal
and factual issues and address the broader conflicts between them.48
Second, and more significantly, mediation serves the increasingly
evident desire of the community to move away from imposed justice in
order to seek-in suitable cases, of course-mutually negotiated and
accepted solutions to legal conflicts. 49  This represents an institutional
manifestation of the emergence of a certain collective maturity, a move
towards the control by society of its own judicial destiny.50 As Carrie
Menkel-Meadow has written, "conventional forms of institutionalized
searches for justice, in the form of courts and trial, are diminishing in use for
a reason. They are suffering from evolutionary demise because they are
failing to satisfy modem requirements for voice, justice, and conflict
resolution."" Though it cannot replace adjudication, mediation contributes
towards rendering justice more human, participatory, and accessible, values
that better reflect many people's needs in dispute resolution.
2
47. See LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE
ch. 2 (2001) for a survey.
48. See Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of
G. Heilman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1083 (1991).
49. See Julie Macfarlane, The Mediation Alternative, in RETHINKING DISPUTES: THE
MEDIATION ALTERNATIVE 1, 4-8 (Julie Macfarlane ed., 1997); Otis, Conciliation Service Program,
supra note 5, at 81.
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to
Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 100 (2004)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance].
51. 1d.
52. See id. ("Mediation offers the opportunity for participating parties to have more authentic
dialogues and make decisions about what is fair and just to them than when an outsider applies rules
that have been enacted by a legislature for some generalized mean, rather than for particularized
human individuals.")
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Alternately criticized5 3 and praised, 54 the existence of alternative modes
of conflict resolution has contributed to the revival of ideological
disagreement regarding concepts of justice, with its tension between
interventionism and liberalism, antagonism and interdependence, and
procedure and substance. Judicial mediation, which integrates mediational
justice within the formal institutional structure of state justice, works
towards resolving the stark dichotomy of these seemingly opposite concepts.
As a result, trial justice and mediation can each in their own way participate
in fulfilling the mission vested in the courts and other tribunals-rendering
justice.
3. Why a Judge?
Why use judges to mediate? This is a frequent question and an
understandable one, given the relatively high cost of scarce judicial
resources and the already heavy demands on judges' time. Mediation need
not be conducted by a judge, of course, even within a courthouse setting. In
many jurisdictions trained mediators are kept as courthouse staff, acting as
officers of the court to perform mediations in much the same way as court
clerks hear motions. Even in Quebec's judicial mediation system, the
parties are free to choose private mediation if they so desire; the choice to
53. See sources cited supra note 3; see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986).
54. See sources cited supra note 2; see also JOILLE THIBAULT, LES PROCtDURES DE
REGLEMENT AMIABLE DES LITIGES AU CANADA 311 (2000) (concluding that the increasing
satisfaction of parties to mediation indicates that mediation is becoming less marginalized and more
of a supplement to the judicial system in Canada); Julien Par6, Solution de rechange pour le
rbglement des litiges: la m~diation, in MtDIATION ET MODES ALTERNATIFS DE RtGLEMENT DES
CONFLITS: ASPECTS NATIONAUX ET INTERNATIONAUX at 193 (Jean-Louis Baudouin ed., 1997)
(discussing the use of mediation within the Canadian insurance system and offering suggestions for
encouraging its further development); Alex Wellington, Taking Codes of Ethics Seriously:
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Reconstitutive Liberalism, 12 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 297 (1999);
Claude Ndlisse, Le r~glement dejudiciarisg: entre laflexibilitg technique et la pluralitjuridique, 23
R.D.U.S. 269 (1992); Donald L. Marston, Project-based Dispute Resolution: ADR Momentum
Increases into the Millennium, 48 C.L.R. (2d) 221 (2000).
55. Mediation programs in most of the United States federal circuit courts of appeal, for
example, are run by court mediators, usually lawyers who are either kept on-staff or who work on a
volunteer basis. See ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE
PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 10,
12-16 (1997), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/mediconf.pdf/$File/mediconf.
pdf. In Canada, many provinces have opted for a similar arrangement. See supra note 10. See
Marie-France Chabot, Des raisons et des manibres d'intdgrer la mddiation dans le systdme dejustice
civile, 40 C. DE D. 91 (1999) for an argument on the advantages of "public mediators."
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mediate with a judge-like the choice to mediate at all-is entirely up to the
parties.56
The multi-door courthouse of voluntary, participant-centered dispute
resolution is a powerful image, but it does not answer the question of why
parties should choose one door rather than another. We have argued that
there are strong justifications for bringing mediation within the state-run
justice system. What is to be gained by devoting judicial resources to it?
Judges are well-suited for the role of mediator for several reasons,
relating both to the perceptions of the parties and to the specific skills
possessed by judges. Of particular importance is the perception of the
judicial office as one of impartiality and independence, which confers on
judges a degree of moral authority.5 This can function to keep the process
on track and to prevent abuses of the process by the parties or their
representatives. Exercising this moral authority is extremely delicate,
however: the consent of the parties is a central pillar of any mediation
system, and judge-mediators must never use their position to manipulate this
consent5 9 The judge-mediator is not there to extract a settlement or to steer
the process towards a particular result but instead to help the parties come to
their own resolution of their conflict.6 ° The judicial office and the parties'
opinion of it can lend credibility to the process and keep it moving when it
might otherwise stop, but to use the office to control the process is to subvert
it.
A more subtle advantage of judicial mediation-particularly at the
appellate level-arises from its institutional relationship to the adjudicative
system. A judge well-trained as a mediator is ideally placed to uphold the
integrity of the adversarial system during the course of a mediation session
by showing appropriate curial deference to the decision of the trial judge.
56. See supra note 5.
57. See supra Part A.
58. See generally MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, A PLACE APART:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CANADA (May 1995). This is a controversial
subject, and public perceptions of the judiciary vary in different countries (and in different
jurisdictions within countries) as well as over time. For the United States, see AN INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AM. BAR ASS'N (1997).
59. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775 (1999); Timothy Hedeen, Coercion
and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are
More Voluntary Than Others, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 273 (2005). See also infra Part B.2.
60. See Hedeen, supra note 59, at 274-75.
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Indeed, to allow a private mediator-even one attached to the courts-to
consider a first-instance decision pending on appeal brings up delicate issues
of confidence in the courts and could potentially affect public perceptions of
the authority of judicial decisions.6'
The judicial mediation model effectively keeps the review process in-
house. Following the trial judge's decision, a fellow judge mediates the
dispute; if a settlement agreement is reached, it is ratified by an independent
panel of judges from the court of appeal. 62 Public perception of the judicial
process can be fragile; an integrated system of judicial mediation for cases
already being litigated ensures that neither process-adjudication nor
mediation-undermines the other.
Besides the perceptions of the parties, judges bring to the table many
particular qualities and skills that make them effective mediators. First,
judges have long experience in intervening between disputing parties.63 This
practical experience is buttressed by a second factor, namely the judge's
commitment both to achieving resolution and to dispensing justice. 64 Third,
the judge is already part of the subsidized public court system. This
provides an enormous benefit to parties for whom both adjudication and
private mediators are too expensive; in the Quebec system, for example,
there is no cost to the parties associated with judicial mediation beyond
preparation expenses. Such programs thus have the potential to offer the
best of both worlds; they provide the flexibility of alternative dispute
resolution but do so by employing existing adjudicators at no extra cost.
A fourth, and obviously important, factor is the judge's knowledge of
the law.65 While this, too, flows from the judge's experience, this
knowledge goes beyond simply discerning how to handle parties to a
dispute. Judges have an understanding of legal issues that permits them
cogently to focus on the issues underlying the dispute and to bring these to
the fore during discussions between the parties, even if this necessarily must
stop short of expressing an opinion on the case. In this way, the presence of
a judge provides the ideal foil to agency costs and efficiency losses between
the parties and their attorneys by providing an experienced supervisory
presence during the negotiations.66
61. Otis, L 'envers du lent droit, supra note 5, at 66-67.
62. QUE. CODE CIV. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 508.1 para. 4 ("Any transaction resolving the
matter is sent by the clerk to a panel of the court so that it may be homologated and rendered
enforceable.").
63. See Otis, L 'envers du lent droit, supra note 5, at 66; Landerkin & Pirie, supra note 4, at
293.
64. See Otis, L 'envers du lent droit, supra note 5, at 66.
65. See id.
66. See source cited supra note 39.
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Judges must of course be trained to mediate and, more specifically, to
negotiate the particular challenges of judicial mediation.67 In the Quebec
program, only those judges who have undergone intensive training
participate in the judicial mediation program. These training courses are
fully adapted to the needs of judges, and allow them both to negotiate the
transition from adjudication to mediation and to mediate effectively.68 The
key is changing the judicial mindset; the judge-mediator's training must
address this explicitly, because there is no place for an adjudicator in a
mediation session.
Adjudication is of course a natural reflex of experienced judges, as is
forming opinions on the matters before them; both, however, present grave
threats to the integrity and viability of a voluntary system of judicial
mediation. 69  For this reason, a judicial mediation system must provide
judge-mediators with strategies to help them shift gears between
adjudication and mediation and must provide supervision as a continuing
complement to the initial training provided. Letting the parties control the
process and the outcome is a challenge for a mediator in any mediation. For
judge-mediators this challenge is intensified, since they will always remain
judges in the eyes of the parties, even when they are in the informal setting
of the mediation room.
The choice of a judge as mediator thus helps effectively combat many of
the problems with the classical system; the question that inevitably arises,
however, is whether this is an efficient use of a judge's time. Judges have
full caseloads as it is; the existence of the very backlog that mediation is
supposed to alleviate is evidence of this. Clearly, adding mediations on top
of the regular caseload is unworkable, so any time spent conducting
mediations must be time during which the judge can no longer hear cases.
Moreover, the time devoted to a mediation session-at the appellate level
generally three to four hours, but sometimes longer-would appear on the
67. See Landerkin & Pirie, supra note 4, at 293-97 (stressing the need for training to neutralize
potential problems with judges as mediators). On training in mediation generally, see Alan Sharp,
The Training of Potential Mediators, in RETHINKING DISPUTES, supra note 49, at 349 and Janine
Higgins, Mediation: The Training Component, in RETHINKING DISPUTES, supra note 49, at 359.
68. In Canada, the National Judicial Institute, together with the Universit6 de Sherbrooke, has
in the past six years developed, under the direction of judges, several training programs in judicial
mediation. These programs, including seminars dealing with negotiation, settlement conferences,
and other aspects of the process, are now available to judges across Canada. See National Judicial
Institute, http://www.nji.ca/Public/documents/Fall2005_004.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
69. Landerkin & Pirie, supra note 4, at 293-94.
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surface to compare unfavorably with the thirty minutes to an hour typically
assigned for the hearings of cases on appeal of the kind that go to mediation.
As we have suggested already, however, such criticisms fail to take into
account the uniquely complementary relationship between adjudication and
judicial mediation. Mediation involves preparation time for the judge-
mediator, of course, as well as the time devoted to the session itself.
Because the judge-mediator plays a facilitative rather than adjudicative role,
however, and because the parties are free to come to their own terms
(subject only to public order and other legal imperatives), the amount of
preparation required of the judge-mediator is usually less than in
adjudication. In contrast to adjudicative hearings, where in many cases the
oral arguments are little more than summaries of the written submissions, in
mediation it is the negotiations and the dynamics of the session itself that
play the largest role. As a result, preparation time is less, particularly when
we recall that appellate adjudication requires preparation by three justices.
Furthermore, a successful mediation results in an immediate settlement
rather than deliberations, another enormous savings of time.70  Finally, a
mediation can address the parties' conflict globally, thus resolving the
principal dispute at the same time as side issues, each of which might
otherwise land before the courts. In short, experience at the appellate level
has shown that the investment of the time of one judge results in freeing up
two other judges to hear other matters and, in many cases, clears the docket
prospectively of a number of procedural or even substantive matters related
to the parties' dispute that would otherwise require separate litigation.
An integrated system of mediation by judges also creates a synergy
between courts, as different courts collaborate in the global resolution of
conflicts. A case before an appellate court often includes other related
matters pending before courts of first instance; a case before a trial court
might likewise include interlocutory or other matters pending in appeal.
Parties can grant a judge seized of one aspect of their litigation the mandate
to settle all connected aspects, even those pending before other courts or
tribunals. The prospect of a complete resolution of their conflict can
convince otherwise reluctant parties to mediate rather than to continue
multiple court proceedings; the advantages of efficiency, cost, and finality
are strong inducements.
70. These savings are especially significant at the trial level. The Superior Court, Quebec's
court of general jurisdiction, has seen significant results from its judicial mediation program (under
the name "amicable dispute resolution conferences"). In the past three years judges have mediated
almost one thousand cases, of which about eighty percent achieved settlement. A great many of
these cases were highly complex civil or commercial proceedings that would otherwise have
required weeks or even months of hearing time. See generally Courteau, supra note 5.
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If mediation fails, of course, the case resumes its place in the regular
docket as if the mediation had never occurred, and such cases result in a net
loss of judicial time. Fortunately, the Quebec appellate mediation
experience shows that this is far from the usual scenario. Of all the cases
each year that proceed to judicial mediation, seventy-five to eighty percent
settle. Even those that do not settle can bring certain benefits to the system,
however. Though what went on in the mediation session remains
confidential, a failed mediation is generally not time wasted, as the parties
and their lawyers can use the experience to help them focus the issues that
remain in dispute.
It is important as well to acknowledge that mediation requires judges to
play a different role than their familiar adjudicative function. The judge
must act more as an efficient and neutral negotiator and not simply as an
oracle decreeing the law to the disputants from on high.71 Though this
greatly expands the latitude of what the judge can do, at the same time it
imposes certain constraints. For example, and most significantly, judicial
mediation is all about empowering the parties, who themselves design the
judicial solution to their problem and who at all times have the option of
returning their dispute to the adjudicative stream.72 For this reason, the
judge-mediator must refrain from expressing any opinion on the legal merits
of the case or, in the case of an appeal, on the validity of the judgment being
appealed.
Such commentary could potentially compromise the court's position and
impair the effectiveness of the traditional system should the case return to
the adjudicative stream. It would certainly undermine the relationship
between the two systems. Though a judge-mediator does not speak
"judicially" during a mediation session, the judge's position in society is
such that it would be difficult for the parties to make this distinction, and
consequently they could easily-and understandably-misinterpret what the
judge says during mediation as the definitive position of the court on an
71. Otis, La conciliation judiciaire, supra note 5, at 1. The judge-mediator is not simply a
managerial or case-management judge but a new phenomenon, a different mode of rendering justice.
See id. Compare with the case management model as discussed in Resnik, Managerial Judges,
supra note 3; E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306 (1986) and Janet M. Wilson, Case Management in Ontario: When There's a Will, There's
a Way, 9 ADVOCATES' Soc. J. 3 (1990).
72. Otis, Conciliation Service Program, supra note 5, at 81.
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issue.73 This is clearly an area requiring a high degree of caution and
restraint and a keen sensitivity to the relationship between the two systems.
Finally, judicial mediation does not, indeed it cannot, be allowed to
mean the end of private mediators outside the court system. The two are not
mutually exclusive, any more than adjudication excludes the possibility of
informal, community-based forms of conflict resolution (interventions by
family, friends, and clergy). Each serves different purposes but at the same
time works towards the same end-resolving conflicts in a satisfactory,
timely, and cost-effective way. The crucial point is to develop a synergy
between conflict-resolution processes, rather than defending jurisdictions.
The availability of judicial mediation in no way excludes the possibility
that parties will resort to private mediators to resolve their disputes; it simply
provides another option, one particularly suited to conflicts at a more
advanced stage. Judges mediate cases already within the formal adversarial
justice system; in most cases these will be problems of a certain duration and
degree of intractability that could benefit from the particular qualities of the
judge-mediator we have described above. The role of private mediators
occurs most effectively at an earlier stage in the conflict process, in order to
resolve, even to prevent, conflicts before litigation seems to be the only
possibility.7
4
In summary, the presence of a judge brings certain benefits to the
mediation process and makes judicial mediation a highly efficient
complement to classical adjudication. Since judicial mediation is a
voluntary process, the role of a judge-mediator is not to compel the parties to
settle by holding the law over their heads like a sword but rather to guide the
parties to a better understanding of their differences in order to resolve the
conflict between them. The presence of a judge reminds the parties of what
is at stake, ensures that the process is capably run in all instances, and allows
continued vigilance of issues like the balance of bargaining power.75
73. See generally Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?-The Need for a Clearer
Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 50-56 (1994) (exploring several coercive
techniques that federal trial judges in the United States have used in mediating disputes).
74. One potential problem with a judicial mediation program is that parties may deliberately
file proceedings-and so juridicize their conflict at the outset-in order to take advantage of the cost
benefits of judicial mediation. This has not been a problem in the Quebec experience-where
judicial mediation is free to the parties-but to avoid it some litigants might be required to submit to
private mediation first, before being eligible for judicial mediation. Quebec already has a similar
requirement in place for family matters, where litigants must attend a pre-hearing mediation
information session in the presence of a mediator who files a report to the court. See QUE. CODE
CIv. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, arts. 814.3-814.14; Hdltne de Kovachich, La mdiation... La
mdiation... La midiationjudiciaire!, 3 REVUE DE PRtVENTION ET RtGLEMENT DES DIFFERENDS
101 (2005).
75. See Stempel, supra note 3, at 361-68.
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Judicial mediation amounts to a new way of rendering justice, one that
empowers the parties and provides justice better suited to their needs. We
turn now to analyze the specifics of the process in this light.
B. The Dgroulement of a Judicial Mediation Session
Despite the presence in each of a judge and the parties, judicial
mediation as a process is markedly different from adjudication. The roles of
the different actors, the communicational dynamics, the ethical constraints
and pitfalls, even the goals sought differ dramatically. These differences
point out some of the normative challenges posed by judicial mediation to
the traditional, and still predominant, way of viewing the law and its role in
society. In what follows, we will examine each of the stages of a judicial
mediation session, beginning with a recognition of conflict, continuing
through consent, opening, communication and negotiation, and finishing
with a decision and closure.76 Each step in the process brings up issues that
illustrate some of the challenges and some of the potentials of judicial
mediation.
1. Conflict
Before there is mediation there is conflict. Conflict is what brings
people to mediation-or to the courts, for that matter-in the first place, and
it provides the essential context in which to understand people's interaction
with the formal institutions of the law. By the time people seek third-party
assistance with their conflict, however-whether from a judge, from a
mediator, or from a friend or relative-it has already reached a certain level
of intractability and most likely financial and emotional cost as well. This
can lead to a tendency to conflate symptom and cause; the immediate
dispute can come to stand for the broader problems underlying it, and the
tendency can be to treat the symptom rather than the disease.77 The
76. This template reflects the approach used in mediation sessions at the Quebec Court of
Appeal and is based on the skills training program used to train judge-mediators in Quebec, which is
itself based (with permission) on the "STAR Approach to Facilitated Conflict Resolution,"
developed by the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at the Pepperdine University School of Law
and adapted to the particular requirements of judicial mediation. See STRAUS INST. FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, ADVANCED MEDIATION PRACTICE: AN
INTERACTIVE TRAINING PROGRAM (1994) (unpublished teaching materials).
77. GREGORY TILLETT, RESOLVING CONFLICT: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 4 (1991)
(distinguishing between disputes and conflicts).
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recognition that a conflict exists is thus an important first step, but more
important is a desire to understand the conflict as a complex manifestation of
human relationships, which depends on these relationships for both its
origins and its solution.1
8
Why people seek outside assistance with their conflicts and from whom
they seek such help are important questions for effectively resolving
conflicts. In other words, before a conflict can be successfully resolved, it
must be understood-not just in the abstract but in the particular and unique
context of the values, assumptions, understanding, emotions, and needs of
the persons involved. 79 For this reason, though it is appropriate to begin our
analysis with conflict, we must first pause a moment to remember that, even
before conflict arises, a relationship usually exists between the parties. 80
This fact is crucial to understanding the real scope of the task of mediation.
As we will see in more detail below, one of the strengths of mediation,
as opposed to adjudication, is that it is possible to explore a problem more
holistically in an effort to resolve the entire conflict and not simply its
particular instantiation (the symptom, as it were) at a given point in time.8'
Our understanding of the fundamentally relational nature of both human
interactions and their legal analogues has increased greatly in recent years.82
Mediation offers a means of appreciating the complexity and power of these
relationships during dispute resolution; it allows conflict to be understood as
it is actually lived, rather than as bracketed into the artificial environment of
the legal dispute.83
78. Cf Marina Cords & Filippo Aureli, Reconciliation and Relationship Qualities, in
NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 197 (Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. De Waal eds., 2000) (reporting
research on how the relational aspects of conflicts between non-human primates influence the
likelihood of reconciliation).
79. See LAURENCE BOULLE, MEDIATION-SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES 65-71 (2001) [hereinafter
BOULLE, MEDIATION] (discussing the importance of diagnosing the dispute to plan the most
effective intervention).
80. Though this is generally true in civil, commercial, and family matters, which have been the
core constituency of judicial mediation, there are, of course, instances where no prior relationship
exists between the parties. (Classic examples include a civil liability case where the parties are
strangers to each other or a financial institution pursuing a surety that it has never met.)
81. See generally Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 36, at 7-29 (advocating
a search for creative conflict resolution techniques that bring "fuller satisfaction of human needs and
interests.")
82. See, e.g., Jean-Guy Belley, Theories et pratiques du contrat relationnel: les obligations de
collaboration et d'harnonisation normative, in LA PERTINENCE RENOUVELtE DU DROIT DES
OBLIGATIONS: BACK TO BASICS 137 (2000) (suggesting that relational contract theory allows
understanding of certain obligations that escape classical and neoclassical contract theory); Robert
Leckey, Relational Contract and Other Models of Marriage, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2002)
("propos[ing] relational contract as a model for analyzing marriage under Canadian law"); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REv. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993).
83. See Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 36, at 8.
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Conflict has marked human history from the beginning-many see it as
a normal and inevitable aspect of humanity.84 The existence of conflict is a
manifestation of life itself--even one of life's vital signs. If an
electrocardiogram shows a point moving across the median, all conflict-all
life-has ceased. Conflict is an expression of intelligence and human
creativity, which exists in a variety of forms and can be found in every
sphere of human activity. New ideas "challenge" orthodoxy; an artist's
creative process is often seen as a "struggle"; ideologies "clash" or "battle."
Far from being an accident of life in society, conflict is its essence; it is the
surest indication that human aspirations, emotions, values, and intelligence,
all the things that make us human, are in working order.
As heirs to a Judeo-Christian world view that sees conflict as suspect
and to a secular liberal philosophy that seeks to neutralize conflict through
the granting of exclusive rights, we have tried to build a society that
excludes conflict or at least walls it in to isolate and contain it.85  This
amounts to the repression of one of the most dynamic and potentially
beneficial social forces. Sociologists have long recognized that conflict is a
normal manifestation of human life and that allowing it to be expressed
creates a more stable and healthy society.86
A state of peace should not be a police state; rather than rigid and static
order, the goal should be diverse forces and opposing tendencies seeking a
point of equilibrium, a harmony of different voices. Conflict remains latent
in peace as peace is latent in conflict: we might view peace as a period for
the consolidation of the gains of conflict and conflict as a beneficial stirring
up of the complacency of peace. The crucial question, however, is how best
to deal with conflict that is both unavoidable and omnipresent and how most
effectively to channel it in constructive rather than destructive directions.87
To start with, it is important to understand that not all conflicts are
created equal. A conflict between two commercial actors over the breach of
84. See, e.g., NIALL M. FRASER & KEITH W. HIPEL, CONFLICT ANALYSIS: MODELS AND
RESOLUTIONS 3 (1984); TILLETT, supra note 77, at 1 (heralding conflict as "an inevitable and
pervasive aspect of human life"); see also OTIs, LA TRANSFORMATION, supra note 12, at 8-9.
85. We might mention the injunctions regarding neighbors contained in the Decalogue as a
religious manifestation of conflict aversion and control and Locke's theory of property rights as one
within the context of secular liberalism. See generally W. BARNETT PEARCE & STEPHEN W.
LITTLEJOHN, MORAL CONFLICT: WHEN SOCIAL WORLDS COLLIDE 30-34 (1997).
86. See GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT (Kurt H. Wolff trans., 1955); LEWIS A. COSER, THE
FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956); MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT:
CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 8-10 (1973).
87. See DEUTSCH, supra note 86.
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a contract will engage very different issues than a conflict between two
spouses over the custody of their child. The former case may seem on its
face less intractable, since it does not engage intense emotions to the extent
that a custody battle does, and since it is more clearly amenable to
compromise.
If we look more closely, however, each conflict raises for its participants
important, albeit different, issues, and these issues-the baggage the parties
bring with them to the court or to the mediation room-affect how the
conflict can be resolved.88 The crucial point is that it is the participants
themselves who determine the ranking of issues engaged by a conflict and
who decide which issues are crucial, which are tangential, and which are not
important at all.89 The nature of the conflict, coupled with the ways in which
the participants understand and characterize that conflict, largely determines
the intensity of the conflict, the scope of its issues, and ultimately the options
for its resolution.
Conflicts differ from one another in fundamental ways, and a large and
multi-disciplinary literature on the analysis and taxonomy of conflict has
grown up.90 The crucial question for working towards resolution is not
whether there is a conflict-that much is a given in the realm of human
interactions-but rather what kind of conflict it is.91  A conflict can be
manageable or unmanageable, contained or expanding, constructive or
destructive, light-shedding or obfuscating, progressive or regressive, helpful
or harmful, bilateral or multilateral, and many other characterizations
besides. The key to resolving a conflict is recognizing it for what it is and
what it is not; in short, one must retain and foster its dynamic and productive
aspects, while neutralizing its destructive side.
At its root, how we understand and interpret conflicts is closely related
to the fundamental paradigm we choose to describe human interactions. Our
institutions, social policies, and dispute-resolution systems will differ greatly
depending on whether we choose to see human interactions as
predominantly conflictual or predominantly cooperative. Often our
worldview and our institutions predispose us one way or the other.
Consider evolutionary biology. The English naturalist Charles Darwin
and the Russian anarchist Petr Kropotkin each independently developed
88. Cf Cords & Aureli, supra note 78.
89. Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, supra note 11.
90. See generally M. AFZALUR RAHIM, MANAGING CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS 17-33 (3d
ed. Quorum Books 2001) (providing a definition and several classifications of conflict); FRASER &
HIPEL, supra note 84, at 3-8; Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 36, at 11-16.
91. See BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 65-71.
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evolutionary theories from radically divergent starting points.92 Where
Darwin saw competition as the driving force, Kropotkin saw cooperation. 93
Darwin's ideas took shape during the famous voyage of the H.M.S. Beagle
to the Galapagos Islands, where he saw large numbers of species crammed
into a small space.94 This situation led Darwin to privilege a Malthusian,
competition-based view of natural selection, where the individuals most fit
or most adaptable survived the struggles for space, food, and mates.95
Kropotkin, by contrast, developed his ideas during a five-year military
service in Siberia, where he saw small numbers of species rattling around in
the vast Russian steppe.9 6 As a result, he developed a view of natural
selection based on cooperation rather than competition: those most able to
cooperate with others in their shared struggle against the harsh environment
survived.97
To move the discussion back to law, the distinction between
adjudication and mediation can in a sense be understood as an example of
this contrast between competition and cooperation as fundamental
organizing principles. Neither is exclusive, of course; cooperation will tend
to engage competitive instincts as well, and competition from time to time
embraces cooperation. Thus, adjudication has a cooperative aspect
inasmuch as it is about justice rather than simply winning and losing.
Similarly, the parties to mediation, whatever their interest in working
together, remain on opposite sides of a conflict.98
In general, however, western law has been fundamentally shaped by a
liberal paradigm that emphasizes autonomy, liberty, and voluntarism; these
qualities all tend towards conflict rather than cooperation.99 A legal system
built around actors who are autonomous, free, and imbued with will tends
naturally to promote individual self-interest. The classical doctrine of
92. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Kropotkin Was No Crackpot, in BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS:
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 325, 327-28, 331 (1991).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 333.
95. See id. at 333-34.
96. See id. at 337.
97. See id. at 331, 337.
98. Critics of divorce mediation, for example, have noted the impossibility of avoiding
competition, See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441,477-548 (1992).
99. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982);
Charles Taylor, Atomism, in 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187 (1985).
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contract is a stark illustration of this; the emphasis on subjective rights in
western legal systems is another.'00
This liberal worldview underlying western law tends to manifest itself in
what we might call an adjudicatory model of conflict rather than a resolutory
model; a game with winners and losers rather than an optimal balancing of
interests and a working towards peace.'0 ' The key difference between
adjudication and mediation, one to which we will return repeatedly below, is
that an adjudicated solution in an adversarial system must have a winner and
a loser, while a mediated solution can seek a cooperative, relational
solution. 102
The recognition of this relational element is crucial in characterizing
conflict and hence in seeking appropriate resolution: 0 3 as Menkel-Meadow
writes, "[w]hile 'disputes' may be about legal cases, conflicts are more
broadly and deeply about human relations and transactions. ' 04
Understanding the extent and intensity of these relational issues in a
particular conflict helps in determining both whether the conflict is
appropriate for mediation and how the mediator will begin to approach
finding a solution.'0 5
2. Consent
Mediation must begin with an expression of consent, since unlike
adjudication, which has a constitutional or statutory basis, mediation rests on
a contractual or transactional foundation. 0 6 The mediator and any decision
the parties ultimately reach have authority, not because the law grants them
authority, but because the parties themselves recognize the validity of the
process and the negotiated decision they reach, and because the law upholds
such settlements. 10
100. On the classical view of contract, see P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 13-17, 121-49
(Clarendon Press 1986). On subjective rights as orienting a legal system away from cooperation, see
Jean-Michel Poughon, Justice et codification, 42 C. DE D. 725, 746-49 (2001).
101. See Bruce D. Bonta, Conflict Resolution Among Peaceful Societies: The Culture of
Peacefulness, 33 J. PEACE RES. 403 (1996).
102. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 504 (1985).
103. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
104. Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 36, at 12.
105. See generally ADAMS, supra note 11, at 200-12.
106. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305,
315 (1970) [hereinafter Fuller, Mediation].
107. See id. Ironically, even as mediation challenges certain implications of the liberal
paradigm (adversarialism and individualism), it relies on other aspects of that paradigm
(voluntarism) for its legitimacy.
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Because the process is thus essentially voluntary in nature, much
depends on the mindset of the parties as they embark on mediation. A party
who cynically uses the process to gain an advantage, knowing that he or she
can abandon mediation and jump back into the adjudicative queue if
mediation does not work as planned, thus undermines the integrity of the
process.108 This puts a particular onus on the parties to define clearly why
they are there, since the nature and scope of their consent will determine the
nature and scope of any settlement reached.
The central role of consent in defining mediation underscores how
different it is from adjudication. Even further, this distinct foundation of the
process implicitly challenges some traditional assumptions about normative
ordering, in particular the still-strong positivist view that law's legitimacy
depends on authoritative imposition from above.'0 9 As Lon Fuller writes:
A serious study of mediation can serve, I suggest, to offset the tendency of modem
thought to assume that all social order must be imposed by some kind of "authority."
When we perceive how a mediator, claiming no "authority," can help the parties give order
and coherence to their relationship, we may in the process come to realize that there are
circumstances in which the parties can dispense with this aid, and that social order can
often arise directly out of the interactions it seems to govern and direct.'1
0
In consenting to bring their conflict to mediation rather than adjudication,
the parties are themselves undertaking to be the architects of the social order
in which they will live.
This idea of control of the process by the parties runs throughout
mediation, and we will return to it in several of the sections below."' This
obviously has revolutionary potential, but it need not mean that mediation is
necessarily at odds with adjudication nor that its mission is to replace it as
the predominant or exclusive source of normativity. Rather, an
understanding of the different bases of the claims of legitimacy by mediation
and adjudication underscores that each plays a distinct and essential but
complementary social role.
108. As we will see in Part C below, ethical constraints can police this, particularly where
lawyers represent the parties. See also John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to
Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REv. 69
(2002).
109. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). See generally GALL, supra note 25,
at 10-11.
110. Fuller, Mediation, supra note 106, at 315.
111. See infra Part B.3.
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Consent-based normativity can co-exist with state-based (or
authoritative) normativity." 2 Judicial mediation, of course, somewhat blurs
the boundary between authoritative- and consent-based normative ordering,
because it combines a basis in the will of the parties with many of the
semiotic trappings of state-based law (for example, it is conducted by a
judge within the courthouse-though not in a courtroom-and it plays out in
the shadow of adjudication, since participants can at any time abandon
mediation and return to the adjudicatory track)." 3 Some types of conflicts
naturally lend themselves better to one or the other,'14 but, in general,
deciding whether a dispute should be litigated or mediated is a question of
tool selection or "fitting the forum to the fuss.""
That is, choosing a process is a political decision made by the parties in
consultation with their lawyers and with the input of the judge who vets
cases for their suitability for mediation. For a given dispute, the parties can
select what they believe to be the more desirable or effective dispute
resolution method, based on the nature of their dispute, their financial and
emotional resources, and their goals for the process.1 6  For this reason,
gaining the joint consent of the parties to mediation involves selling them (to
a certain extent) on the idea of mediation by convincing them that a
particular tool (mediation) will be the best way to resolve their particular
conflict.
Not every matter can appropriately or effectively be mediated, of
course, and a variety of constraints push the parties in one direction or the
other.117 On a public level, the nature of the process along with received
ideas of legal boundaries and appropriate legal remedies combine to limit the
availability of judicial mediation. 18  In Quebec, judicial mediation is
available for most civil, family, commercial, administrative, and criminal
matters, while constitutional questions and issues involving the definition of
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the Quebec
112. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, 11 NOMOS 3 (1969).
113. The semiotics of adjudication, mediation, and other forms of dispute resolution are
explored in Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, I PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 29 (2000).
114. See Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 35, at 366-71.
115. See generally Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action:
An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE I (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002); Sander & Goldberg, supra note 11.
116. Sander & Goldberg, supra note 11.
117. See generally ADAMS, supra note 11, at 238-41.
118. This was a central concern of Owen Fiss, whose early critique of settlement remains
important today. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 3, at 1082-85; David Luban, Settlements
and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995). Among responses to this argument,
see especially Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 2.
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Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms are excluded ab initio.119 Even
within the recognized areas of competence, however, family cases involving
violence (where no realistic possibility of a balance between the parties
exists) or assault (where pending charges or violence towards children give
the cases a public-law importance) are beyond the scope of a mediated
settlement. 2 ° On a private level, factors such as time, costs, or a particular
desire for public vindication can lead parties either towards or away from
mediation."'
In vetting cases for mediation, however, it is important to be sensitive to
the quality of the consent. For example, a party who faces a long and
stressful ordeal in court to collect a larger award may choose to accept a
discounted settlement immediately rather than wait. This is understandable,
but the judge-mediator must protect the integrity of the process by verifying
that consent has been freely expressed in such situations.
Though allowing the parties the choice of consenting to work together to
resolve their conflict is a radical initiative, it simply gets the parties into the
mediation room, nothing more. Once seated face-to-face in the presence of
the judge-mediator, the dynamic process of clarifying and redefining their
conflict-mediation proper, in other words-begins, and it is here that the
normative implications of judicial mediation begin to be most evident. It is
to this subject that we now turn.
3. Opening
The mediation session proper opens with a plenary session, which
gathers the parties, their lawyers, and the judge-mediator together. 2 2 This
session serves two purposes. First, it allows the participants to understand
why they are there and how the mediation will proceed. Second, it allows
119. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, pt. I; Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q.,
c. C-12.
120. In Quebec, these limits are not statutorily defined, but rather reflect an understanding of
the proper domain of mediation in the Quebec legal system, defined in practice through the vetting
of the parties' Joint Request for Mediation.
121. See generally Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, supra note 11 (contending that parties
make decisions about mediation based on how they "think and feel about [their] conflict").
122. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 178-83. See generally Michael Wheeler, Anxious Moments:
Openings in Negotiation, 20 NEG. J. 153 (2004) (discussing some of the particular problems
associated with openings).
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the judge-mediator to pin down the precise terms and scope of the mandate
so as to set clear goals for the next several hours.
The judge-mediator begins with an opening statement, during which he
or she explains to the parties several key aspects of judicial mediation that
clarify its differences from adjudication. First, the parties must understand
that the judge-mediator acts as a mediator and is there neither to impose a
decision on the parties nor to give an opinion about the merits of the case. 123
Second, the parties must be assured of the confidentiality of the process,
which in Quebec is a legal obligation under the Code of Civil Procedure.12 4
Third, the judge-mediator reassures the parties that what goes on during the
mediation session will go no further and that the mediation file will remain
separate from any subsequent court action should the mediation fail. 125
Fourth, the judge-mediator explains the process, stressing that it is the
parties themselves who are in control.
26
These explanations are crucial, since at this stage-as at all other steps
in the process-the full and clear consent of the parties is required. 127 For
this reason, the judge-mediator must dwell on certain issues that raise
concerns regarding consent. In particular, this means clearly explaining the
difference between plenary and caucus (or individual) sessions and
reinforcing that what goes on in the caucuses is strictly confidential. 128 Also,
it means emphasizing the importance of good faith throughout the process,
because mediation requires a climate of trust to succeed.
129
123. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
124. See QUE. CODE CIV. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 151.21 ("Anything said or written during a
settlement conference is confidential"). Id. art. 508.1 3 (regarding appeals) ("A settlement
conference is confidential and is governed by the rules defined by the judge and the parties. The
judge who presides at the conference cannot take part in any hearing relating to the matter."). On the
still unsettled question of exceptions to mediation confidentiality, see infra Part C. 1.
125. The courts in Canada are beginning to define the parameters of this insulation of judicial
mediation from adjudication. See, for example, the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
Condessa Z Holdings v. Rusnak (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 96. For an argument that pre-trial
conference privilege should be limited, see John A. Epp, Civil Pretrial Conference Privilege: "A
Cosmic Black Hole"?, 72 CAN. BAR REv. 337 (1993).
126. See QUE. CODE CIV. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 151.18 ("In agreement with the parties, the
judge defines the rules of the settlement conference and any measures to facilitate its conduct, and
determines the schedule of meetings.").
127. See supra Part B.2; Nolan-Haley, supra note 59.
128. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 183-88.
129. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 188-89 (1987); ADAMS, supra note 11,
at 75-78.
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Once the judge-mediator has laid these foundations, the parties must
agree on his or her mandate. 30 This too is of fundamental importance, since
the quality and scope of any ultimate settlement depends on the clarity and
scope of the mandate that sets the process in motion. The main issue here is
whether the mandate will be limited to the specific dispute at issue or
whether it will extend to the settlement of other linked cases pending in the
courts.I3'
With the problem set out in this way, the judge-mediator can then work
out ground rules and a timetable with the parties and their lawyers.1 2 This
involves determining the sequence of plenary and caucus sessions, the
timing of breaks and consultations, and exactly who will be present and
when (for example experts).1 33 The normal rules of adversarial procedure do
not apply in mediation;1 34 it is up to the parties to find a workable procedure.
The experience of the judge-mediator (and the lawyers), however, can
ensure that whatever procedure is decided upon will be effective, efficient,
and fair.
Finally, the plenary session is usually followed immediately by a
meeting between the judge-mediator and the lawyers, the latter acting here
as officers of the court to serve the interests of justice within the judicial
mediation process. 35  The judge-mediator and the attorneys can use this
brief meeting, in the absence of the parties, to clarify various issues,
particularly whether it would be most fruitful to proceed by plenary or
individual sessions. More importantly, it allows the judge-mediator to get a
feel for the case and the dynamics between the parties, since the lawyers are
well-placed to evaluate and relate particular difficulties with the case, the
sensibilities and personalities of the parties, and other information that can
affect how negotiations will proceed. Knowledge is important at this stage,
130. As a consent-based procedure, the parties determine the scope of issues to be mediated, in
consultation with the judge-mediator, of course. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; HENRY
J. BROWN & ARTHUR L. MARRioTT, ADR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 129 (2d ed. 1999).
131. Otis, Conciliation Service Program, supra note 5, at 82.
132. Otis, L "envers du lent droit, supra note 5, at 66.
133. QUE. CODE CIV. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 151.17 ("Other persons may also take part in
the conference if the judge and the parties consider that their presence would be helpful in resolving
the dispute.").
134. Mediation is not, of course, an anything-goes free-for-all. See Jack M. Sabatino, ADR
as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998) (arguing that certain procedural norms continue to apply in
the context of mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISp. RESOL. 179.
135. On this role of lawyers in mediation, see infra note 228 and accompanying text.
381
31
Otis and Reiter: Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation of Ju
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2006
and the meeting with the lawyers allows the judge-mediator to get a
participant's-eye assessment of the outlines of the case.
The opening of the session thus allows the judge-mediator, together with
the parties and their lawyers, to characterize and frame the issues to be
negotiated.136 In judicial mediation at the appellate level, much of this
characterization will already have been done. Typically, the parties have
gone through litigation at first instance, and frequently they-and their
lawyers-have at least evaluated their case for appeal, even if they have not
always gotten to the stage of preparing briefs, facta or written arguments.
Characterization involves winnowing, as ineffective arguments are
abandoned, issues are focused, and-inevitably-positions are rendered
more stark and less nuanced.'3 7 This can be a hindrance to effective
mediation if lawyers approach mediation with an adversarial mindset, but it
can also help the process if lawyers can shift to a mediational mode of
thinking. 138 On the one hand, classification and characterization of issues
are limiting processes; they shut off avenues of inquiry, they blind the
parties to potential solutions inconsistent with the chosen characterization,
and they commit the parties to a particular logic that may not be the most
effective in the circumstances. On the other hand, however, a carefully
prepared case, where lawyers have thoroughly canvassed all issues and
reviewed them with their clients, leads to more effective and focused
negotiation. 139 It is also important to remember that characterization is a
dynamic process, and much will depend on how the discussions to follow
unfold.
The spatial configuration of a mediation session is also important, and
this is something to be dealt with at the opening. 140  A courtroom is
constructed to facilitate communication in a V shape: the parties' lawyers
speak directly to the bench and only exceptionally to each other. Moreover,
the point of the V (the judges) represents the endpoint of communication;
the parties each present information to the judges, not through them to each
other, because it is the judges who will ultimately render a decision.
Mediation is structured (or ideally should be structured) differently.
Here communication is triangular, with the parties addressing each other,
136. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 72-74.
137. See generally Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC.
372 (1996).
138. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers'Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics
and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
269 (1999).
139. See CINNIE NOBLE ET AL., MEDIATION ADVOCACY: EFFECTIVE CLIENT REPRESENTATION
IN MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS 65-90 (1998).
140. See BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 30-32.
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even if at certain stages of the process this is done only indirectly through
the mediator. 41 The mediator is thus not an endpoint but rather more of a
conduit; the parties converse with each other through the mediator, because
they themselves are responsible for the outcome. 14 2 Adjudication operates
on an adversarial model, which accentuates the image of the parties as
hostile opponents; mediation works on a conversational or dialogic model,
which facilitates negotiation and ultimately cooperation. 43
This dynamic applies even if the parties are so hostile that they cannot
be in the same room during negotiations.' 44 In such a situation the role of
the mediator assumes particular importance, since it is he or she who closes
the triangle by deciding how and when to transmit particular information
between the parties so as to maximize the chances for settlement without
compromising either party's position or the duty of confidentiality
associated with caucus meetings. 45 In cases where negotiations take place
via plenary sessions, on the other hand, seating arrangements and speaking
order must be arranged carefully so as to facilitate dialogue between the
parties while at the same time protecting the equality and fairness of the
process. 146
The judge-mediator's job in the opening, therefore, is to maintain the
gap between adjudication and mediation, so as to keep the rigid
classifications characteristic of litigation out of mediation as much as
possible, and to prevent the process from becoming simply litigation by
another name. This can involve asking the parties to step away from the
formal legal characterization of the dispute and put themselves back into the
mindset of the original conflict, before it became juridicized. By leading the
parties away from rigid adherence to a particular characterization of their
dispute, the judge-mediator can facilitate analyzing and understanding the
problem from different perspectives, which is an essential preliminary step
for the communication to follow. 47
141. Jonathan M. Hyman, Swimming in the Deep End: Dealing with Justice in Mediation, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 19, 22 (2004).
142. See Brunet, supra note 4, at 235.
143. See id.
144. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 183-84.
145. See id. This has particular ethical implications for a judge-mediator; see the discussion
below in Part C. 1.
146. BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 30-32.
147. See supra note 136-39 and accompanying text. See also ADAMS, supra note 11, at 69-70.
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4. Communication and Negotiation
The essence of mediation is oral communication between the parties. 148
The mediator is a facilitator, through whom the parties speak directly to each
other.149 As we saw in the previous section, the dynamics of communication
in mediation are fundamentally different than in adjudication, and
understanding and exploiting these differences are crucial to effective
mediation. 5
To say that a mediator is a facilitator, however, is true as far as it goes,
but this characterization downplays the vital role that facilitation plays in
moving the parties towards agreement. At the opening of a judicial
mediation session, the parties are firmly in an adjudicative mindset: their
positions are defined adversarially, the conflict is generally conceptualized
in win-lose terms, and discourse focuses on respective rights and
entitlements.151 Their narrations will at first remain strongly adversarial,
centered on grievance and blame. 1
52
Later the mediator will work to change this mode of discourse; at the
outset, the simple fact of frankly expressing a point of view is enough.' 53 In
telling their stories in each other's presence, the parties can begin to
establish the dynamic of speaking and listening that will mark the rest of the
session. This polarization of positions is magnified in appellate mediation,
where the parties have already been through a trial and sometimes even
drafted written submissions for the appeal hearing. In short, though the
parties are communicating at the start of mediation, they are not yet
negotiating, since the crucial element of listening is missing at this point. 1
54
The judge-mediator's job is to effect this transition from communication
to negotiation, from narrative to dialogue, from lecture to conversation. 155
As the mediation progresses, the mediator must work to shift communication
from the I-centered airing of points of view with which the parties began to
148. See generally Bonaf6-Schmitt, supra note 22, at 164-67, where he describes mediation as
"une nouvelle oralitd."
149. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
150. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 183-88.
151. Id. at207-10.
152. Id.
153. On the communicational dynamics of mediation, see generally Gary Smith, Unwilling
Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Mandatory Mediation Might Not, 36 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 847 (1998); BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 115-41; and ADAMS, supra note 11, at 213-
21.
154. BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 126-28.
155. See Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute Resolution
Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1028 (2001) (viewing the mediator's role as participating
actively in the "social construction of meaning").
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the resolution-centered negotiation that will ultimately lead to settlement.
On the one hand this involves changing the dynamics of communication
from the V-shaped adversarial model to the triangular conversational model
that we discussed above. 156 The mediator must work actively to close off the
communicational triangle and get the parties to engage with each other. On
the other hand, and more fundamentally, it involves changing the mindset of
the parties from one of competition to one of settling the problem. This shift
is, of course, much more difficult than simply getting the parties to
communicate, because parties generally reflexively associate law with
adversarialism; 15 7 but it is the key to the entire mediation.
At a basic level, transforming the communicational dynamic requires
creating a different dynamic of listening between the parties. 158 Presenting
positions to a judge requires one kind of listening, while participating in a
conversation requires another, and mediation as we have seen aims to be
conversational rather than adversarial. In adjudication, one listens to the
arguments of the other side only to refute those arguments when it is one's
own turn to speak. We might call this "destructive listening," since its
purpose is to pick apart what the other party is saying, and everything is
interpreted with this goal in mind. In other words, listening is done in such a
way as to benefit the listener, nothing more.
Mediation, by contrast, requires what we might call "constructive
listening," which aims both at comprehending and at keeping the
conversation going. Since settlement rather than victory is the goal, the
listener must evaluate things from both sides and not strictly from his or her
own point of view. Listening here may be of benefit to the listener, of
course, but it is done so that the dialogue is the main beneficiary. For the
mediator, fostering this shift requires being particularly attentive to the
power dynamics of communication, because voice and silence can be
manifestations of power differentials.159 At this stage, it is imperative that
communication be open and free.
156. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
157. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 207.
158. See BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 126-28; ADAMS, supra note 11, at 179;
CHERYL PICARD ET AL., THE ART AND SCIENCE OF MEDIATION 232-33 (2004); CHRISTOPHER W.
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 175-77 (3d
rev. ed. 2003).
159. Morgan Brigg, Mediation, Power, and Cultural Difference, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 287
(2003).
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Changing communication from adversarial to conversational also
involves bringing the parties to the realization that communication is a
relational process and that its dynamic will be colored by the past and future
of the parties' relationship as well as its present.' 6° Unlike adjudication,
with its procedural and evidentiary strictures, mediation allows the parties to
explore their dispute holistically, as a conflict involving human relationships
rather than simply as a single flashpoint.1 61 The law of inheritance offers an
especially vivid illustration of the difference, because such matters bring into
sharp relief the tension between the legal dispute with its narrow focus
(Does this will meet the criteria for validity? Who is entitled to inherit?) and
the human conflict behind the dispute with its messy and entangling but
crucially important extra-legal concerns (I took care of the deceased for
years, and now I get nothing!). Negotiation builds on and feeds off an
understanding of the relational aspects of conflict, and the judge-mediator's
task is to seek ways to foster this understanding.1
62
An aspect of this relational understanding of legal dynamics is the
cultural dimension of conflict. The cultural assumptions of the parties, their
lawyers, and even the judge-mediator can present significant obstacles to
successful mediation, because the same conflict can be understood in
markedly different ways depending on the cultural lens through which it is
viewed.1 63 This calls for sensitivity on the part of the judge-mediator and, in
particular, an understanding of the complexity of culture as it intersects with
concepts of conflict and their resolution. 164 Recent research on culture has
stressed that it is a multi-faceted phenomenon and cannot be boiled down to
a single defining characteristic like ethnicity. 65  Moreover, culture is not
something that can be avoided or put aside, but awareness of potential
problems and openness about solutions can help participants work towards
understanding divergent viewpoints. 
166
160. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance, supra note 50 (discussing temporal issues
in mediation).
161. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
162. See SUSSKIND&CRUIKSHANK,supra note 129, at 32-33.
163. On culture and conflict, see David Kahane, Dispute Resolution and the Politics of Cultural
Generalization, 19 NEG. J. 5 (2003); Douglas P. Fry, Conflict Management in Cross-Cultural
Perspective, in NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 78, at 334; and Brigg, supra note 159.
For examples of cultural dynamics during mediation, see Otis, LA TRANSFORMATION, supra note 12,
at 21-22.
164. See ANDREW J. PIRIE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SKILLS, SCIENCE, AND THE
LAW 282-306 (2000).
165. See Cynthia A. Savage, Culture and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
269, 272-73 (1996).
166. Kevin Avruch & P.W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and
Prospects, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION 131
(Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 1993).
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Finally, though the substance of communication and negotiation in each
mediation will always be unique and will depend on both the facts of the
case and the parties themselves, it is worth discussing one aspect of
communication common to most mediations, the role of emotion.
167
Emotions make a conflict what it is, and any attempt to deal with a conflict
holistically must address its emotional content directly and not ignore or
censure it.
A distinctive characteristic of communication in mediation is that it
need not be strictly limited to the formal-rational mode as required by
adjudication. 168 This is not to say that anything goes. As a legal process,
mediation will still be, and should be, dominated by the mindset of
rationality: naked appeals to emotion without grounding in logic or reason
should rightly be discounted or discarded. Rather, because mediation is a
conversation designed to explore the relationships behind a conflict, the
mediator can more freely allow expressions of emotion to color the
proceedings, since emotion can be a window onto the real conflict behind
the dispute. 69 Letting parties express emotional reactions to the conflict or
the proceedings rather than simply present thought-out legal positions can
allow the mediator to see where the truly intractable problems lie and can
provide insight into why the parties have taken the positions they have.
1 70
Of course, negotiations rarely go perfectly smoothly, and a judge-
mediator will often be faced with an impasse at some point in the
negotiations.17' Understanding the dynamics of the situation-the parties'
relationships, their cultural standpoints, and the emotions behind the
167. See generally Daniel L. Shapiro, Emotions in Negotiation: Peril or Promise?, 87 MARQ.
L. REV. 737 (2004) (exploring how an understanding of emotions can benefit a negotiator); Laura E.
Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 205 (2002) (discussing how emotions effect
an adjudicator's impartiality, competence, and independence); Eric A. Posner, Law and the
Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001) (employing economic analysis to examine the relationship
between emotions and various areas of law); Filippo Aureli & Darlene Smucny, The Role of Emotion
in Conflict and Conflict Resolution, in NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 78, at 199
(discussing the insights that an understanding of emotion provides for interpreting and resolving
conflict).
168. See Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 36, at 27-28. Cf Jonathan R.
Cohen, Reasoning Along Different Lines: Some Varied Roles of Rationality in Negotiation and
Conflict Resolution, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 111 (1998) (arguing that "[i]n negotiation and conflict
resolution, reasoning does occur and should occur along many lines").
169. Bonaf6-Schmitt, supra note 22, at 166.
170. Id. at 166-67.
171. Among the literature on impasses and stalled negotiations, see BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra
note 79, at 175-77; SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 129.
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problem--can suggest what is behind the impasse and can help break up a
logjam in negotiations. 172 This calls on the particular skills of the judge-
mediator, especially experience in reading people and situations; the moral
authority of the judge-mediator is a significant asset at this point and may
mean the difference between settlement and stalemate.
5. Decision
Negotiation leads ideally to a settlement that will end the conflict
between the parties. Once agreement is reached, it is up to the lawyers to
put that agreement on paper; the judge-mediator plays no part in drafting the
substance of the settlement and will leave the room at this point. 173  This
does not end the mediator's role, however, as he or she may have to return to
work with the parties on any unforeseen problems that might arise. The
devil is, as always, in the details.
Also, once the agreement is drawn up, it must be reviewed with the
parties to ensure that it accurately reflects their consent and that it resolves
the conflict as fully as their expressed consent allows. 7 4 If there are no
problems, the decision can then be confirmed as a settlement by the court,
thus disposing of the case. 175 Verifying the validity of consent is decidedly
not an assessment by the judge-mediator of the substance of the agreement,
which (barring violations of public order or other provisions of law) is up to
the parties alone. 176 Rather, it is the first step in its implementation.
This first step is a crucial one that the judge-mediator cannot run
through hastily or cursorily. The parties must live with their settlement, and
to do so they must agree to it and understand it. On the one hand, the nature
of the process itself ensures a certain measure of comprehension by the
parties. Since mediation gives the parties a high degree of self-
determination,'77 and since communication and negotiation in mediation are
structured so as to ensure that the proceedings are accessible to the parties
172. See BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 175-77.
173. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 196; NOBLE ET AL., supra note 139 at 114-17.
174. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 59; PICARD ET AL., supra note 158, at 183-84; MOORE, supra
note 158, at 357-65.
175. QUE. CODE CIV. PROC., R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 151.22 ("If a settlement is reached, the judge
homologates the transaction on request."). For appeals, see supra note 62.
176. Otis, La conciliationjudiciaire, supra note 5, at 9.
177. But cf Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 4 (2001)
[hereinafter Welsh, Thinning Vision] (noting that as mediation becomes increasingly
professionalized and institutionalized, parties are becoming less producers than consumers of
settlements negotiated and drafted by lawyers).
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themselves, rather than just to their lawyers, 178 by the time agreement is
reached, the parties should be more or less on the same page.
On the other hand, however, mediation is a highly prospective endeavor,
so the agreement must remain comprehensible to the parties even after they
are no longer in the presence of their lawyers and the judge-mediator. The
benefits of mediation, particularly the idea of global settlement of a conflict,
would largely be lost if the parties had to run to their lawyers or to the courts
every few years to interpret the terms of their agreement. A successful
mediation agreement must thus be comprehensive and comprehensible to
those it affects, or it runs the risk of creating dependencies on outside
interpreters that can eventually lead to frustration of its object and renewed
conflict. 79
Understanding this prospective function of mediation is of vital
importance, because mediation, much more so than adjudication, is often
focused on the existence and maintenance of a relationship between the
parties. 18° Adjudication is a primarily retrospective process: it seeks to
decide a past dispute between the parties and only incidentally will it have
prospective effects, if the parties choose to use the decision to help them
reorient any future interactions that might arise between them. 181 Mediation,
by contrast, is more explicitly prospective in orientation. 182 By seeking to
resolve a conflict globally, rather than just dealing with a particular
instantiation of that conflict, mediation recognizes that the parties are linked
to one another in a complex relationship; mediation thus works actively to
178. BOULLE, MEDIATION, supra note 79, at 241-42.
179. See PICARDETAL., supra note 158, at 183-84.
180. See, e.g., Fuller, Mediation, supra note 106, at 314 ("Mediation by its very nature
presupposes relationships normally affected by some strong internal pull toward cohesion.");
Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664 (1985)
(upholding justice as a product of "reconciliation of brother to brother, sister to sister, sister to
brother, child to parent, neighbor to neighbor, buyer to seller, defendant to plaintiff, and judge to
both"). For a critique of this view, see Fiss, Out of Eden, supra note 3.
181. Public-interest litigation, such as constitutional issues or cases involving the definition of
fundamental rights and freedoms, is another matter, however, as it frequently has strong prospective
effects. An example is the recent decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal on the unconstitutionality
of barriers to the solemnization of same-sex marriages. See Catholic Civil Rights League v.
Hendricks, [2004] R.J.Q. 851. The prospective and transformative effects of such public-law
adjudication are widely diffused through society, however, rather than being limited to the parties,
and this is one reason why such matters are not amenable to mediation. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
182. See Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance, supra note 50, at 98.
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create for the parties a new modus vivendi.'83 What mediation helps the
parties to do, to use Lon Fuller's apt description, is to draft a kind of
constitution for their relationship. 84  The negotiated agreement creates a
normative universe within which the parties agree to live.' 8'
Not all mediation must necessarily involve ongoing relations between
the parties; a damages claim between strangers, for example, is perfectly
suited to mediation, though it creates nothing more than a financial link
between the parties. But the majority of cases going to mediation do. 186
Melvin Eisenberg has described this as the difference between dispute-
negotiation and rulemaking-negotiation-between negotiation "directed
toward settling disputes" and negotiation "directed toward establishing rules
to govern future conduct."' 87 Effective resolution of family matters, many
commercial disputes, property squabbles between neighbors, and so forth
requires rulemaking-negotiation to help the parties live together, because the
conflicts behind such disputes depend strongly on the relationship between
the parties.
The agreement reached is thus of a very different nature than a judicial
decision, and it is vital that the parties understand this difference. Beyond
simply paying a sum of money or shifting a boundary line, the conflicts
calling for rulemaking-negotiation require the parties to adapt their behavior
to the negotiated solution. 188 It is up to the judge-mediator to stress this
point. Drafting the settlement is only the beginning; the real implementation
begins when the parties leave the mediation session with their agreement in
hand and start to reorganize their lives along the lines of the constitution that
they have just drawn up.
6. Closure
Finally there is closure, which involves more than simply wishing the
parties well and sending them on their way. In a successful mediation, after
the settlement has been agreed to by the parties and drafted to their
183. See Bonafd-Schmitt, supra note 22, at 161.
184. See Fuller, Mediation, supra note 106, at 311.
185. See id.
186. At the Quebec Court of Appeal, cases involving ongoing links between the parties (family
matters, employment disputes, or landlord/tenant conflicts) make up a significant percentage of
mediations.
187. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 637-38 (1976). Eisenberg notes that these two forms of
negotiation are not mutually exclusive. See id.
188. Cf ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 81-84 (1994) (advocating
a "transformative orientation to conflict" that includes strengthening relational ties).
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satisfaction, the mediator has an opportunity to review the process with the
parties. It is here that the full promise and innovation of judicial mediation
becomes evident.
As we argued above, mediation differs from adjudication in that it has
an explicitly prospective purpose and effect. 89 The parties are not just
resolving a past dispute; they must carry their relationship forward, beyond
the stumbling block of the particular disagreement for which they sought
mediation. This brings to the fore a different aspect of both mediation and
mediator, one that is latent in the entire process but that we can bring out
explicitly at this point-namely, the educative or teaching function of the
process.
Judicial mediation is particularly suited to developing and exploiting
this teaching role. The judge-mediator brings to the process moral authority
as well as intimate experience with both adjudication and mediation, and this
unique position allows the judge-mediator to step back from the dispute and
the mediation process to ask the parties what they have learned, in effect to
conduct a brief but searching autopsy of the mediation session. Here, the
judge acts not as a neutral interlocutor as was the case during the
negotiations proper but rather as an active instructor, drawing lessons from
the process and showing the parties how they have just succeeded in
communicating with each other and how, through negotiation, they have
begun a dialogue centered on solving their problem rather than on sterile
antagonism.
In examining the preceding hours, the judge-mediator can lead the
parties to understand and to integrate into their lives the basic principles of
conflict resolution. In other words, the judge-mediator teaches the parties
how they might use in their own lives the tools that they may not even have
realized they were getting. This can take five minutes or fifteen; what is
important is that the parties come to realize that what they have just done is
not limited to a formal process of judicial mediation and not limited to the
particular dispute but is applicable to any future conflict in which they find
themselves. The judge-mediator in effect shows the parties how to become
agents of peace, working at the micro level to transform society.
In effect, then, the mediation process has come full circle; when the
parties next arrive at a conflict, either with each other or with third parties,
they will have a set of skills learned in mediation to enable them to work
towards a solution without recourse to the courts. The procedure we have
189. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
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discussed here-from conflict through consent, opening, communication,
negotiation, decision, and finally closure-is not just a process to be used in
a courthouse mediation chamber, before a judge-mediator, and in the
presence of lawyers. It is a heuristic for approaching any conflict. The
mediation process can in this way serve to train a kind of corps of informal
mediators who will take their place alongside formal judicial mediation and
adjudication in the dispute resolution universe to handle some of life's
everyday conflicts before they need third-party intervention.
The efficiency benefits of this are obvious; for a judge-mediator to teach
people strategies for resolving conflicts on their own may add a few minutes
to a mediation session but has the potential of keeping future cases off the
dockets in the first place. But more than that, it brings forward an essential
aspect of the law (and by extension the judge) that is often overlooked-its
pedagogical function.' 90 Part of the judicial role has always been social:
judges work to ensure the smooth running of society by resolving disputes
and attempting to ensure coordination and even cooperation rather than
antagonism. 9' Judicial mediation and the educative lessons it brings
forward allow the judge-mediator to play a more active role in pacifying the
wider environment into which the parties return after they have settled their
specific legal dispute.
C. Ethics in Judicial Mediation
As our survey of the ddroulement of a judicial mediation session has
suggested, ethical issues arise throughout the process, and they present
particular problems for the different actors who are called on to play
unfamiliar and often shifting roles during a mediation session.' 92 For judges
in particular, mediation moves them out of their familiar adjudicative role
and into closer proximity to the parties than is ordinarily the case. This has
important ethical implications, since the judge-mediator's facilitative role
puts him or her in the delicate position of keeping and on occasion
strategically revealing the confidences of the parties.'93 This is a much more
190. See, e.g., JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003). Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the
Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992) (critiquing the idea that the
United States Supreme Court should play an educative role).
191. Lon Fuller, for example, saw adjudication as one of the basic forms of social ordering.
Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 35, at 363-65.
192. See generally Catherine Morris, The Trusted Mediator: Ethics and Interaction in
Mediation, in RETHINKING DISPUTES, supra note 49, at 301, 302 (emphasizing the importance of a
broad approach to ethics in mediation, including all participants).
193. See the discussion of caucus sessions supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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active role than the reactive role judges ordinarily play and, as such, requires
sensitivity to the potential conflicts that might arise.
For lawyers as well, the different roles required in mediation move the
lawyer outside the ordinary ethical framework designed with advocacy and
representation in mind. 194 To a certain extent the lawyer must subordinate
vigorous advocacy of the client's position in favor of the agreement sought,
because the goal of mediation is settlement, not victory.195 In this section we
will briefly explore these challenges by highlighting some problems and
suggesting solutions in this area.
196
Our current ethical models in law were developed primarily in the
context of adversarial litigation and interpersonal conflict. Professional
secrecy rules, for example, presume a potential conflict over the information
in question; conflict of interest rules help protect vigorous advocacy of the
client's interests; and judicial impartiality ensures that litigation is a fair
fight. Mediation destabilizes this paradigm in various ways, as we have
seen. Most importantly, though mediation arises from conflict and involves
two (or more) sides in what is at root still an adversarial relationship,
effective mediation involves not confrontation or competition but
cooperation.' 97 As such, mediation requires that legal ethics be redefined
away from the paradigm of competition and towards what Carrie Menkel-
Meadow has called "non-adversarial ethics."'' 98
Existing ethics codes and principles, whose rules tend to reflect
traditional judicial and lawyerly practice, often can be adapted to the
practice of mediation only with difficulty.' 99 Rules and guidelines for
194. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics].
195. See id. Cf Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a
Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L.
REV. 141 (2004).
196. A thorough analysis of the ethical implications of mediation in general and judicial
mediation in particular is beyond the scope of this article. This section draws on some of the
analysis and examples in an unpublished paper by Justice Georgina Jackson of the Court of Appeal
for Saskatchewan. Georgina Jackson, The Place of the Ethical Principles for Judges in Judicial
Mediation (June 3-4, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
197. ADAMS, supra note 11, at 35-36.
198. Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 194, at 414.
199. One can read the Canadian Judicial Council's Ethical Principals for Judges, for example,
as applying to judge-mediators, though the applicability is neither entire nor always evident.
Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (1998), available at http://www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/ethical-e.pdf. Regarding the situation in the United States, see Susan M.
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mediation can help remedy this defect, though care must be taken to avoid
the assumption that the tried-and-true principles will continue to serve well
when applied in new areas. 200 There is a crucial difference between judicial
mediation and adjudication, however, which puts particular emphasis on
ethical accountability-its non-public nature. 20 ' This leads to several areas
of ethical concern, each of which requires rethinking or readapting existing
ethical principles.
First, because mediation ordinarily takes place in closed sessions
involving only the parties and their representatives and because the
discussions and presentations during those sessions are protected by strict
confidentiality, the possibilities for appellate review of the process are
limited.2 °2 This puts an onus on judges and advocates alike to be especially
vigilant in protecting the interests of justice. Second, given that a mediation
session is generally more wide-ranging and open-ended than a court hearing
and given the central role the parties play in this frank exchange of positions
and ideas, the parties' scrutiny would tend to focus more on relatively
abstract issues of ethics, accountability, and justice than on legal principles
and procedural guarantees. 2°3  Third, the process itself brings judges into
closer contact with litigants and their counsel than does ordinary litigation,
and this contact takes place in an atmosphere where rules and boundaries are
not clearly defined. 2°  Caucusing meetings, private ex parte discussions,
even telephone and e-mail exchanges initiated by the parties present ethical
dilemmas for both the judge-mediator and the lawyers involved, dilemmas
Gabriel, Note, Judicial Participation in Settlement: Pattern, Practice, and Ethics, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 81, 89-95 (1988).
200. The draft Uniform Mediation Act, for example, includes detailed provisions regarding
confidentiality, privilege, and conflicts of interest and reflects a certain maturity about the place of
mediation in a legal system. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Mediation Act (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/uma200 I.pdf.
Compare the earlier guidelines for the mediation and conference programs in the United States
Federal Courts of Appeals, which mention ethics only once and regarding the attorney, not the judge.
NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 55, at 45. See generally Denis F.
Gauthier, Ddontologie en mddiation, in 68 DtVELOPPEMENTS RtCENTS EN MtDIATION 83 (1995)
(discussing the ethical considerations in mediation, particularly for attorney-mediators); Pierre
Rtnaud, L '9laboration d'un code de d~ontologie en mediation: une reflexion, 27 R.D.U.S. 31 (1996-
1997).
201. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 2, at 2682-87, 2694-96
(questioning the potential benefits of increased publicity and scrutiny of settlements); Epp, supra
note 125.
202. This is a subject requiring further study.
203. See generally ADAMS, supra note 11, at 266-90 (surveying the accountability of mediators
with respect to various recourses against their actions).
204. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J.
Disp. RESOL. 1.
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much less frequently encountered in the more well-defined world of
adjudication.2 °5
In what follows, we will look at these points in the light of three issues
that have become frequent points of reference for thinking and legislation on
mediation: confidentiality, party autonomy, and fair treatment. Though
these issues do not exhaust the field of ethics in judicial mediation, they are
the principal areas of ethical concern and illustrate important differences
between ethics in the context of judicial mediation and in the context of
adjudication. This will be followed by some remarks on the particular
implications of judicial mediation for the ethical responsibilities of lawyers
participating in the process.
1. Confidentiality
The entire efficacy of mediation rests on the confidentiality of the
proceedings; without confidentiality, frank exchanges of ideas and the
climate of trust necessary for fruitful negotiations are both impossible.20 7 As
previously noted, the general rule is that mediation proceedings are
confidential and cannot subsequently be brought up in court, barring very
rare and exceptional circumstances (for example threats to public safety).20 8
If we turn from considering confidentiality as the legal obligation
defining the entire process to viewing it as a matter of ethics, we see that the
205. See id. See also Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REv. 147 (2003); Michael
Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 81 (2003).
206. These are organizing principles of both the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Conciliation (2002) and the Uniform Mediation Act. UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002 (2004), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/ml-conc-e.pdf; Uniform Mediation Act,
supra note 200 (prefatory note). See generally Nadja Alexander, The UNICITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation-An Interview with Jernej Sekolec, 15 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP. 105 (2004).
207. See generally ADAMS, supra note 11, at 290-300; Bonaf6-Schmitt, supra note 22, at 161-
64; Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 194, at 441-43; Anne M. Burr, Confidentiality in Mediation
Communications: A Privilege Worth Protecting, DIsP. RESOL. J., Apr. 2002, at 64, 66.
208. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; ADAMS, supra note 11, at 290-300. Defining
the parameters of mediation confidentiality or privilege has been a hotly contested area. See Epp,
supra note 125; Burr, supra note 207; David A. Ruiz, Note, Asserting a Comprehensive Approach
for Defining Mediation Communication, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 851 (2000); Ellen E.
Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 239 (2002); Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on
Judicial Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 29 (2003).
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closed nature of the mediation process puts the judge-mediator in a
particularly delicate ethical position. As facilitator of the process, the judge-
mediator gets knowledge of sensitive information and must know how to use
this information to promote settlement while at the same time respecting the
exigencies of confidentiality.
The required balancing act comes out most clearly with regard to caucus
sessions or ex parte meetings with the parties individually. This is
confidentiality within confidentiality. During such meetings, confidential
information is frequently revealed, sometimes with specific instructions
about how this information is to be revealed to the other party.209 This can,
of course, appear to engage judicial impartiality, particularly since it is the
judge-mediator who transmits the information and so must walk a fine line
between excessive caution that can stifle opportunities and excessive
liberality that can engender complaints of either partiality or breach of
confidence.
Judges must be ever mindful that their role as facilitators is an active
and not a passive one and that their choices of phrasing, emphasis, or timing
in transmitting information have ethical implications. By intervening during
the course of a mediation session, the judge makes particular strategic
choices involving the information at hand-choices designed to move the
mediation process towards settlement. In a sense, the more information at
the disposal of the judge-mediator, the more danger there is in revealing-
even inadvertently or by implication-information that one party regards as
confidential or prejudicial. Negotiating this minefield requires solid and
thorough skills training on the part of the judge-mediator (as indeed it does
also for mediators in the private sector), careful preparation through clear
definition of the mandate, and continual verification of consent.
2. Party Autonomy
The role of the judge-mediator is circumscribed in particular distinctive
ways due to the nature of the mediation process itself, in which it is the
parties who are in control and who in large measure determine how things
unfold.210 One of the key differences between judicial mediation and
adjudication is the empowerment of the parties to define, prioritize, and find
a resolution to their conflicts. 21 ' This means that though the judge-mediator
is the guardian of the fairness of the process (about which we will say more
209. See supra note 124-28.
210. See supra Part B.3.
211. See, e.g., Georges A. Legault, La mdiation et l'thique applique en riponse aux limites du
droit, 33 R.D.U.S. 153, 184 (2002-2003).
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below), as to its substance his or her role is limited to verifying that the
parties give real consent to the agreement they reach and that the settlement
respects public order and is not manifestly and extremely unfair.212
This caveat is all the more important because during mediation the
judge-mediator remains a judge, imbued with particular status, powers, and
duties, whose opinion and presence are highly influential for the parties and
counsel alike.211 In these circumstances it is essential that judge-mediators
keep in mind that their role is to facilitate and promote the autonomy of the
parties and not to adjudicate.214
3. Fair Treatment
Though the specifics of the procedure to be followed and the substance
of any agreement are up to the parties, the judge-mediator must work to
protect the integrity of the mediation process from abuses of influence or
power. 2  Dealing with such power issues at the outset is essential to prevent
the mediated solution from simply replicating or reinforcing the problems
that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.21 6 This is important not just
for the individual mediation session but for the institution of mediation more
generally, because problems regarding the fairness of a particular mediation
can lead to public questioning of the process as a whole, which in turn can
undermine the effectiveness of future mediations. In the absence of formal
procedural rules-and without the added safety valve of a right to appeal-a
danger exists that the public will perceive the process as arbitrary and so
unfair.217
This requires particular attention to two factors that can give rise to
perceptions of unfairness. First, judge-mediators must be particularly
sensitive to the dynamics of power in mediation and confront their own
assumptions in different ways than in the more formalized adjudicative
212. See supra Part B.2.
213. See supra Part A.3.
214. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
215. See generally Hyman, supra note 141.
216. See generally Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2000) (defining
power imbalances and offering strategies for combating them in negotiations).
217. See Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, supra note 11, at 697-703.
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process.' 18 Second, judge-mediators must be aware of cultural differences in
expectations and in negotiating style and must handle these differences
carefully and respectfully.21 9 These factors both come back to the issue of
consent; as guardian of the fairness of the process, the judge-mediator must
always be vigilant that consent is free and clear and that the process is not
structured so as to unreasonably handicap one party or the other, especially a
party unrepresented by counsel.
4. Lawyers' Ethics
Mediation imposes particular ethical obligations on lawyers as well,
distinct from those in adjudication.22' In contrast to classical adjudication,
mediation is designed to give voice to the parties themselves; as we saw
above, communication is directed between the parties (with the judge-
mediator serving only as facilitator, not as interlocutor), rather than between
the parties' representatives and the judge.222 The role of lawyers is therefore
more vaguely defined in mediation than in adjudication: their presence is
seldom required, sometimes unwelcome, and can represent a problematic
invasion of the classical adjudicatory model into the new paradigm of
judicial mediation.223 For these reasons, certain of the lawyer's traditional
ethical obligations require adaptation to this new context.
In Quebec, lawyers' conduct is governed by the Code of ethics of
advocates, which applies to every lawyer "regardless of the context or
manner in which he engages in his professional activities. 224 The lawyer
representing a client in mediation, in other words, is obliged to continue to
act as a lawyer and, thus, is bound by the provisions of the Code of ethics. 225
218, This is particularly important in the context of divorce mediation. See Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1582-83 (1991); Bryan,
supra note 98.
219. See Kahane, supra note 163.
220. See supra Part B.2.
221. There has been little commentary on the ethical aspects of the lawyer as representative
during mediation, as opposed to the lawyer as mediator. Ethics are mentioned only briefly in Jovette
Ltoumeau & Andrd Ladouceur, Le rdle de l'avocat en midiation, in 162 DEVELOPPEMENTS
RCENTS EN MtDIATION 33 (2001); Suzanne Clairmont, L'avocat et la mediation, in 80
DtVELOPPEMENTS RIeCENTS EN MtDIATION 155, 159-60 (1996); Gauthier, supra note 200, at 86. An
exception is Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 194.
222. See supra note 141-43 and accompanying text.
223. See NOBLE ET AL., supra note 139, at 65-69, 107-12.
224. Code of ethics of advocates, R.Q. c. B-l, r.1, art. 1.00.01 [hereinafter Code of ethics].
225. See id.
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The lawyer's ethical obligations pull in two directions, however, particularly
since the modifications to the Code of ethics in April 2004.226
On the one hand, the lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the client;227 on the
other hand, the lawyer now also "shall serve justice" and "may not act in a
manner which is detrimental to the administration of justice. 228  In the
context of mediation, this means that lawyers may find themselves tom
between loyalty to the client, which looks to an adversarial or competitive
conception of advocacy, and the interests of justice, which looks rather to an
inquisitorial or cooperative conception. 229 As we saw above, a competitive
win-lose model is not the most fruitful way to work towards a resolution of
conflict, yet for a lawyer it is unavoidable given the dual conception of the
lawyer's role as representative of the client and officer of the court.23 °
This tension in the lawyer's role is evident in several other provisions in
the Code of ethics as well and has the effect of circumscribing the scope of
advocacy during mediation. For example, the duty to serve justice requires a
lawyer to "co-operate with other advocates to ensure the proper
administration of justice,' 231 and where a party is unrepresented the lawyer
must be vigilant so as not to lead that party into error or abuse the party's
good faith. The effect of these ethical constraints is to move the lawyers'
role during mediation away from advocacy and towards general support,
advice-giving, and explanation.233
226. See Quebec, O.C. 351-2004,7 April 2004, G.O.Q. 2004.XVI.1840, ss. 5 and 14.
227. See Code of ethics, supra note 224, art. 3.00.01.
228. Id. art. 2.01.0 1, paras. 1-2. Compare also art. 3.06.05, which provides, "An advocate shall
safeguard his professional independence regardless of the circumstances in which he engages in his
professional activities. In particular, he must not let his professional judgment be subject to pressure
exerted on him by anyone whomsoever."
229. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 194, at 426-29; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 152-54 (1993). Cf James A. Cohen,
Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer of the Court," 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349
(2000) (arguing that lawyers should not "be burdened with special responsibilities to seek justice that
are inconsistent with duties to clients").
230. See supra note 101-02 and accompanying text. See also ADAMS, supra note 11, at 68;
KRONMAN, supra note 229.
231. See Code of ethics, supra note 224, art. 2.05.
232. See id art. 3.02.01(i).
233. See id. art. 3.02.04 (duty to explain "the nature and implication of the problem... and of
the risks inherent in the measures recommended"); id. art. 3.02.10 (duty to inform the client about
any settlement offers); id. art. 3.03.02 (duty to provide explanations "necessary for the understanding
and evaluation of the professional services rendered to him").
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The prime actors in mediation remain the parties themselves; their
representatives, like the judge-mediator, have ethical duties that look to
protect the integrity of the mediation process and that limit how active a role
they can play. For lawyers engaged in judicial mediation, this means
especially being conscious of the ultimate goal of the process, which is
settlement rather than victory.234 This puts lawyers into a largely unfamiliar
position, since their role as officers of the court comes forward as their
advocacy role recedes.
Finally, it is worth noting that the lawyer's role as officer of the court
adds a further duty, namely advising the client on the availability or
suitability of mediation.235 In the Quebec appellate program, a judge may
recommend mediation to the parties at the stage of permission to appeal or
while hearing matters as a judge sitting alone, if the judge considers the case
suitable for mediation. It may happen, however, that the parties never
receive this suggestion to mediate (as, for example, when a case proceeds
directly to appeal by right) and so may remain ignorant of the availability of
mediation, however suitable it might be.
This presents the danger of rent-seeking behavior on the part of the
lawyers. In a large, lengthy, fact-driven case, for example, lawyers
obviously have a financial incentive in proceeding to trial, even though such
cases are eminently suitable for mediation since they involve few if any
questions of law and so have little value as precedents, and since they
inordinately consume court resources. Preventing such behavior is partly a
question of education: lawyers and the general public alike must be informed
of the availability of mediation and its suitability for certain kinds of
cases. 23 6  It is also an ethical issue, however, which engages lawyers'
obligations to facilitate the administration of justice and to avoid profit-
seeking behavior.237
234. See Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect
Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 83, 96 (2002).
235. See Greene v. Mills, [2003] R.J.Q. 3253 (Court of Qudbec) (holding that a lawyer has a
duty to inform the client of the availability ofjudicial mediation services).
236. See generally Marie-France Chabot, Le rd1e de l'avocat i l'heure des modes alternatifs de
reglement des litiges, in 80 DtVELOPPEMENTS RECENTS EN MEDIATION 127 (1996) (suggesting that
attorneys have the responsibility to educate and direct their clients to the appropriate form of dispute
resolution for their conflict). On the need for broad education regarding ADR, see ANDREW J. PIRtE,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SKILLS, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 386-94 (2000).
237. See Code of ethics, supra note 224, art. 2.05 ("The advocate must avoid any procedure of a
purely dilatory nature and co-operate with other advocates to ensure the proper administration of
justice.") and art. 3.08.03 ("The advocate must avoid all methods and attitudes likely to give to his
profession a profit-seeking or commercial character.").
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CONCLUSION
As the judicial mediation model takes hold and creates a new way of
approaching dispute resolution within the formal institutions of justice, new
challenges will arise. As with any process that goes up against an
entrenched paradigm, solutions to these challenges will require new ways of
thinking that go beyond the assumption that adjudication is normative, while
other forms of conflict resolution are alternative or exceptional. The goal
remains the same: resolution of legal conflicts in a just, complete, and
efficient way. Judicial mediation provides another way to achieve this, one
that is integrated fully within the formal legal system, but that tempers-in
suitable cases-its rigidity and formalism.
23 8
Most obviously, as the model matures, it may be profitable to expand its
scope to embrace a broader range of disputes, outside its foundation of civil,
commercial, and family matters. In Quebec, a pilot project has been
launched for criminal cases, and the program at the court of appeal has
grown to embrace administrative law matters and complex, multi-party
litigation.239 Setting the boundaries of mediation, however, gives rise to
many questions of a practical, institutional, ethical, and political nature, and,
as always, this requires a balancing of the often divergent demands of
efficiency and justice.
The expansion of judicial mediation cannot simply be blind empire-
building, but nor should expansion be limited simply because mediation is
unfamiliar or untried in a given area.240  A paradigm-challenging
development must be assessed on its own terms and not on those of the
paradigm it challenges; it is important to keep pre-conceived ideas of what
law is for and what it can and cannot do from blinding us to the potential
benefits of applying new methods to different kinds of problems.
Clarification of the ethical principles engaged by mediation is an
ongoing challenge and one that does not admit of easy answers. As we have
seen, judicial mediation gives rise to a variety of ethical problems for the
judge-mediator and for the lawyers who participate.24' These ethical
238. See supra Part A.2.
239. On the Quebec program of facilitation in criminal matters, see supra note 6.
240. Even ADR's most enthusiastic proponents recognize that it is not suitable for all cases, and
reports of the death of adjudication have proved to be premature. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as Legal Institutions and Roles
Evolve, 57 CURR. LEGAL PROBs. 85 (2004). For an argument on the continuing social need for
broad access to adjudication, see Resnik, For Owen M Fiss, supra note 36.
241. See supra Part C.
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problems are moreover dynamic: they shift and change contours during the
different stages of a mediation session. Any statements of ethical principles
must thus account for all the different actors in judicial mediation, recognize
the different roles each is called upon to play during a session, and
conceptualize their ethical obligations in relational rather than strictly
individual terms.
A third significant issue to be monitored as judicial mediation matures
and spreads is the tendency towards the professionalization of the process. 242
Experience in the United States has shown that non-adjudicatory forms of
dispute resolution are subject to various pressures along these lines and that
the ideal of self-determination by the parties can easily give way to
settlements mandated by the courts, hammered out by professional lawyers,
and effectively imposed on the parties.243
The exclusion of professional advocates is not the answer-too much is
at stake, and the potential for power imbalances is too great-but it is
important to counteract the natural tendency of lawyers to transform all
disputes into win-lose justiciable cases. 244 The danger is that mediation will
become simply another species of adjudication, a zero-sum game where
competition and not cooperation rule, and that its considerable benefits will
be lost in the process. Avoiding this requires changes to legal education and
professional training in order to remove the ingrained conception that
adjudication is the norm and that alternative dispute-resolution processes are
to be tolerated in the name of efficiency only.
The emergence of new modes of conflict resolution within state-
controlled justice systems bears witness to the increased responsibility
individuals are taking with regard to the legal resolution of their problems.
It points to the emergence and acceptance of a new conceptualization of the
law, one that no longer views law as a transcendent and immutable state
monopoly against which the individual plays a strictly reactive role.245
Faced with increasing scarcity of resources, growing efficiency crises
affecting judicial institutions, and the realization that the traditional avenues
of dispute resolution can sometimes foster the very adverse dynamics of
242. See generally Georges A. Legault, La professionalisation de la mediation, in 162
DtVELOPPEMENTS PECENTS EN MEDIATION 91 (2001).
243. This concern has been expressed by, among others, Resnik, Many Doors?, supra note 1;
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 2, at 2693-94; and Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note
177.
244. ADAMS, supra note 11, at 68.
245. See, e.g., Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, What Is a Critical Legal
Pluralism?, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 25, 39-40 (1997) (emphasizing the creative role of legal subjects in
"inventing" the law).
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conflict that they seek to solve, people are looking to reclaim the power to
resolve their own disputes.
This is not a sign that the traditional normative order is losing
legitimacy. Rather, it is a sign that order is undergoing democratic renewal,
an indication of a healthy flexibility whose effect can only be to strengthen
its legitimacy. The participation of judges-guardians of social order and
democratic values-alongside the community in this transformation of the
classical system of civil justice, bears witness that the gap between the
judicial and the social is shrinking and that our conception of law and the
institutions which administer it is broadening as a consequence. This can
only mean that society, better understood, will be better served.
53
Otis and Reiter: Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation of Ju
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2006
54
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol6/iss3/2
